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I. INTRODUCTION

This article explores the question of whether constitutional
principles exist to regulate arbitrary governmental action in the
administration of welfare. The idea for the article developed from the
recognition of problems associated with implementation of the 1996
Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
("Welfare Reform Act" or "the Act").' Specifically, in the context of a
devolved model of welfare administration, some local governments
are administering welfare programs without rules, regulations,
policies or procedures.2 In the past, concerns about the lawless
administration of welfare might have been resolved by application of
procedural due process protections. While some scholars suggest that
these protections continue to apply despite the existence of statutory
language to the contrary, 3 recent cases call into question the scope of
*
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1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
(Supp. V 1999)) [hereinafter PRWORA]. This Article does not address the question of
whether or not welfare reform has been successful in decreasing poverty. However,
researchers at University of California at Berkeley, Columbia University, Stanford
University and Yale University conducted a study that analyzes the success of welfare
reform. See BRUCE FULLER ET. AL., GROWING UP IN POVERTY PROJECT, NEW LIVES FOR
POOR FAMILIES? MOTHERS AND YOUNG CHILDREN MOVE THROUGH WELFARE REFORM
(April 2002) (finding that while many women have moved into low-wage jobs, most
still live below the poverty line).
2. Christine N. Cimini, Welfare Entitlements in the Era of Devolution, 9 GEO.J.
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 89, 125-32 (2002). This article describes Colorado's system of
second order devolution and the problems of accountability that arose. Specifically, in
a survey of all sixty-three counties it was found that thirty-six were operating without
specific local policies or procedures. Of the thirty-six operating without written
policies or procedures, thirty-four employed other incomplete tools, such as state plans,
flow charts, or checklists to assist in the administration of the program; two counties
had no written policies, no flow charts, no graphs, nor any inter-office memoranda to
guide workers in the administration of the program; and five counties were using old
AFDC policies to administer the new TANF program.
3. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform"
ProceduralDue Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 591, 599 (1998)
(explaining that once a statute is enacted, the question of whether there is a
constitutionally protected interest is a question for the judiciary); Cimini, supra note 2,
at 114-23 (arguing that certain statutory mandates support the finding of a property
interest in the receipt of welfare benefits); Christine N. Cimini, The New Contract:
Welfare Reform, Devolution, and Due Process, 61 MD. L. REV. 246 (2002) (arguing that
the concept of a social contract and the existence of actual legal contracts between the
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protections afforded by the procedural Due Process Clause.4 Further,
where local governments or private entities administer welfare
programs, traditional administrative law remedies may be
inapplicable.5 In the absence of these checks on governmental action,
this article examines whether non-statutory, constitutional principles
limit arbitrary governmental action in the current administration of
welfare programs. While this article does not propose that these
constitutional principles, in and of themselves, resolve the problems
associated with arbitrary governmental action, it does posit that such
principles represent a necessary foundation for the assertion of
rights.
Enactment of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996 fundamentally
changed the long-standing structure and nature of public assistance
to adults with dependent children. From its inception in 1935 until
1996, welfare to adults with dependent children was provided under
Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"),6 a federal
welfare program administered by the states.7 Under AFDC's model of
cooperative federalism, the federal government set eligibility criteria
and states were provided open-ended funding based on the number of
eligible recipients in their state.8 No time limit on the receipt of

government and individual welfare recipients create a property interest under the Due
Process Clause) [hereinafter Cimini, The New Contract].
4. Compare State ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 575
S.E.2d 393, 402 (2002) (holding that the welfare recipient's due process rights under
the federal constitution do not require "a pre-termination hearing before ending TANF
cash assistance" because Congress and the West Virginia Legislature found that
recipients are no longer entitled to cash assistance), with Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d
469, 477 (Colo. 2002) (holding that although there is no longer an "absolute
entitlement" to welfare benefits, "once welfare recipients have complied with statutory
standards and have begun receiving benefits, the right to welfare becomes a property
right which cannot be compromised without procedural due process protections").
5. See infra notes 295-96 and accompanying text.
6. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-97ii (2000)) [hereinafter SSA].
7. Throughout its history, the AFDC program was administered based on a model
of cooperative federalism. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968) (articulating,
for the first time, the term "cooperative federalism" to describe government programs
that are run with concurrent federal and state oversight). Under this model, the
federal government provided money to the states which, in turn, administered the
program in accord with federal and state rules and regulations. Id. at 316-17. See
also Leonard Weiser-Varon, Injunctive Relief From State Violations of Federal
Funding Conditions, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1236, 1236-39 (1982) (describing the
cooperative federalism model of administration used to administer public assistance
programs).
8. MARK GREENBERG ET AL., CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, WELFARE
REAUTHORIZATION: AN EARLY GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 3-4 (July 2000), available at
http://www.clasp.org./publications/welfarereauthorization an-early-guide.pdf.
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assistance existed and all eligible recipients received benefits.9
Though recipients were subject to some work requirements, these
requirements did not impact as large a portion of the welfare
caseload as did the work requirements set forth under the 1996 Act.10
Further, since the landmark case of Goldberg v. Kelly, welfare
benefits have been considered a property interest for purposes of
procedural due process protections.,' Within this context, the
potential for the arbitrary exercise of agency discretion was limited
and the exercise of that discretion was subject to court review.
By contrast, the 1996 Welfare Reform Act replaced AFDC with a
program entitled Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
("TANF"),12 that devolved authority to the state level and permitted
states to devolve authority down to local governments.1 3 The Welfare
9. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(1)(A) (1994) (amended 1996) (stating that all eligible
recipients were entitled to receive assistance); King, 392 U.S. at 317 (emphasizing the
statutory requirement that "aid ... be furnished. .. to all eligible individuals").
10. See Matthew Diller, Working Without a Job: The Social Messages of the New
Workfare, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 19, 20, 32 n.7 (1998) (explaining that the most
comprehensive of the work requirements was mandated by the 1998 Family Support
Act).
11. 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 (1970) (stating that welfare benefits "are a matter of
statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them").
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (1996) (titling the relevant portion of the statute as Block
Grants to States for Temporary Assistance to Needy Families). A publication of the
House Committee on Ways and Means described the shift from AFDC to TANF as
follows:
TANF greatly enlarges State discretion in operating family welfare, and it
ends the entitlement of individual families to aid. Under TANF, States
decide what categories of needy families to help (AFDC law defined eligible
classes and required States to aid families in these classes if their income
was below State-set limits). Under TANF, States decide whether to adopt
financial rewards and penalties to induce work and other desired behavior.
Also, States set asset limits (AFDC law imposed an outer limit) and continue
to set benefit levels.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1998 GREEN BOOK 398 (Comm.
Print 1998) [hereinafter 1998 GREEN BOOK].
13. 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (providing block grant payments to states that allow each
At the same time the federal
state to administer its own welfare program).
government has devolved authority to the states, it has retained very limited authority
to regulate state conduct. See 42 U.S.C.§ 617 ("No officer or employee of the Federal
Government may regulate the conduct of States under this part or enforce any
provision of this part, except to the extent expressly provided in this part."); see also
MARK GREENBERG & STEVE SAVNER, CENTER FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, A
DETAILED SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY
FAMILIES BLOCK GRANT OF H.R. 3734-46 (Aug. 1996) (identifying the limited federal
oversight and regulation of state and local governments implementing welfare); JULIE
A. NICE & LOUISE G. TRUBEK, CASES AND MATERIALS ON POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 193 (Supp. 1999) (detailing how the federal statute explicitly limits the
Department of Health and Human Services' authority to regulate state
implementation of TANF).
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Reform Act also gave states wide discretion to create welfare
programs to further the Act's broadly defined purposes. 14 Under
TANF the federal government provides states with block grants of a
pre-determined level of funding that does not guarantee coverage for
all eligible recipients.15 Unlike under AFDC, recipients of TANF are
limited to sixty months of welfare benefits during their lifetime,16
and must meet certain work requirements.17 Additionally, the Act
In terms of local devolution, see ANNA LOVEJOY & ELAINE M. RYAN, AMERICAN
PUBLIC WELFARE ASS'N, DEVOLUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE LOCAL
LEVEL: WELFARE REFORM EFFORTS IN FIVE STATES (1998) (explaining that five states,
namely Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Colorado and Wisconsin, have devolved
significant authority to local governments). For analysis of state inequities as a result
of devolution, see Ingrid Phillips Whitaker & Victoria Time, Devolution and Welfare:
The Social and Legal Implications of State Inequalities for Welfare Reform in the
United States, 28 Soc. Just. 76 (2001). See also Shanta Pandey and Shannon CollierTenison, Welfare Reform: An Exploration of Devolution, 28 Soc. Just. 54, 69 (2001)
(concluding that "the economic conditions of, and opportunities for, women living at
the margins of society do not necessarily improve with decentralization of welfare
programs from federal to state and local governments").
14. 42 U.S.C. § 604(a)(1) (Supp. V 1999) (providing that states have broad
discretion to spend TANF funds in "a manner that is reasonably calculated to
accomplish the purpose[s]" of the block grant or in any manner that was permissible
under the program being replaced by the block grant). The stated purposes of the
block grant are to:
(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be cared for in
their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end the dependence of
needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work,
and marriage; (3) prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock
pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and
reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation
and maintenance of two-parent families.
Id. § 601(a)(1)-(4).
15. Id. § 603(a)(1); see also GREENBERG & SAVNER, supra note 13, at 10-19
(explaining that eligible states will receive a grant "in an amount intended to reflect
recent federal spending' on AFDC and AFDC-related programs and some states will
receive annual adjustments known as supplemental grants while other state funding
amounts will include penalties or bonuses).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A), (C)(ii) (1996) (prohibiting a state from using TANF
funds to provide assistance to a family with an adult who has received assistance from
any state TANF program for sixty months, whether consecutive or not). The statute
includes a hardship exception that permits a state to exempt a family from the sixty
month time limit if a hardship exists or if the family includes an individual who has
been "battered or subjected to extreme cruelty," as defined by the statute. Id. §
608(a)(7)(C)(i), (iii). The statute permits states to exempt only twenty percent of their
caseload. Id. § 608(a)(7)(C)(ii); see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 264.1-264.3 (2003); Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 17, 845-49 (Apr. 12, 1999)
(preamble discussion).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(1)(A)(ii). States are required to ensure that the requisite
percentage of recipients are participating in "work activities." The statute details
twelve "work activities" which qualify toward the participation rate, including:
unsubsidized employment; subsidized private sector employment; subsidized public
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specifically states that welfare is no longer an "entitlement," calling
into question the previously long-standing procedural due process
protections afforded to welfare recipients.1S
This new structure of devolved administrative authority and
increased bureaucratic discretion raises numerous concerns about
the accountability of welfare administrators,19 especially if local
governments are administering welfare programs without any rules,
regulations, policies or procedures.20 Prior to welfare reform,
concerns about bureaucratic accountability and increased discretion
in the welfare context could be addressed by limitations imposed by
the procedural Due Process Clause.21 In light of significant changes
in the Welfare Reform Act, including its proclamation that welfare is
no longer an entitlement, the procedural Due Process Clause may no
longer provide welfare recipients the remedies it once did. While
there is debate as to whether the statute's "no entitlement" language
is controlling, courts that have addressed this question are split, or
uncertain, as to the applicability of traditional procedural due
sector employment; work experience; on-the-job training; job search and job readiness
assistance; community service programs; vocational educational training not to exceed
twelve months; job skills training directly related to employment; education directly
related to employment if recipient does not have a GED or high school diploma;
satisfactory attendance at secondary school; and provision of child care services to
individuals participating in community service. Id. § 607(d). While the statute lists
these activities, states are permitted to further define each category. See 45 C.F.R. §§
261.30-261.36 (2003). Unless a state opts out, it must require a parent or caretaker
receiving assistance under the program who is not exempt from the work requirement
and not engaged in work to participate in community service. States determine the
minimum hours per week required of individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(1)(B)(iv).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (stating that the statute "shall not be interpreted to entitle
any individual or family to assistance under any State program funded under this
part"). But see sources cited supra note 3.
19. See generally Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration:Rules,
Discretion, and EntrepreneurialGovernment, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121 (2000) (exploring
the ways in which the new model of welfare administration, referred to as
"entrepreneurial government," raises public accountability questions).
20. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
21. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-269 (1970) (holding that procedural
due process requires a pretermination evidentiary hearing be held when public
assistance payments to a welfare recipient are discontinued); Atkins v. Parker, 472
U.S. 115, 128 (1985) (finding that food stamp benefits are statutory entitlements,
thereby creating a property interest in eligible recipients); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 331-32 (1976) (recognizing that a recipient's interest in the continuation of
disability benefits constitutes a property interest for procedural due process purposes);
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1971) (finding implicitly a property interest
in benefits under the Social SecurityAct); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401-02
(1971) (finding implicitly a property interest in Social Security Disability benefits);
Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that foster care
benefits amount to an entitlement for eligible individuals to receive benefits under
state law).
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process protections.22
Within this context, the question this article explores is whether
there exists a concept of non-arbitrariness that imposes limitations
on the administration of welfare benefits without rules, regulations,
policies or procedures. To address this question, the article explores
the concept of non-arbitrariness within various jurisprudential
doctrines and the potential applicability of the concept to limit
23
arbitrary governmental action in the welfare context.
The definition of arbitrariness employed here draws together
common elements from numerous sources including judicial
decisions, scholars and legal dictionaries. For the purposes of this
article, I utilize the following definition of arbitrary: without
25
adequate determining principle;24 irrational, not based in reason;
22. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Wash. Legal Clinic for the
Homeless v. Barry, 107 F.3d 32, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (doubting that "blanket 'no
entitlement' disclaimers can by themselves strip entitlements from individuals in the
face of statutes or regulations unequivocally conferring them"); Weston v. Hammons,
No. 99-CV-0412, at 19 (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 1999) (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law) (rejecting the defendant's contention "that when Congress specified that benefits
are not an entitlement, it intended to prevent the creation of a property interest and
thereby prevent due process rights from attaching ... [because] it is inconsistent with
the mandatory nature of the program ... [and] to the extent congress did intend to
prevent due process rights from attaching, that would be constitutionally
impermissible. Congress may not create a property interest by the substantive
provisions of a statute but defeat the right to due process merely by reciting that there
is no entitlement."); Reynolds v. Giuliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
("Plaintiffs also have an overarching property interest in their continued receipt of
food stamps, Medicaid and cash assistance."); Richardson v. Kelaher, No. 97-CIV-0428,
1998 WL 812042, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998) (holding that a welfare recipient who
challenged the procedural adequacy of sanction notices issued for the reduction of her
cash assistance had "a 'legitimate claim of entitlement' to any benefits provided under
this policy, [i.e.,] she has a state created property interest which she may not be
deprived of without due process of law.").
23. However, the inquiry is limited to the question of arbitrariness as it applies in
the administrative regulatory context. Thus, this Article does not explore judicial or
congressional arbitrariness in a general sense nor does it address prohibitions on
arbitrariness provided by statutes such as the Administrative Procedures Act. 5
U.S.C. §§ 500-96 (2000).
24. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 104 (6th ed. 1990) ("Without adequate
determining principle; not founded in the nature of things; nonrational; not done or
acting according to reason or judgment; depending on the will alone; absolutely in
power; capriciously .. "); United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 243 n.14 (1946)
(defining arbitrary as "without adequate determining principle... [or] [f]ixed or
arrived at through an exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or
adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances, or significance .... decisive
but unreasoned") (internal quotes omitted); Flower Cab Co. v. Petitte, 658 F. Supp.
1170, 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (defining arbitrary as a decision reached "without adequate
determining principle or ... unreasoned") (internal quotes omitted).
25. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 104 ("Without fair, solid, and substantial
cause; that is without cause based upon the law,...; not governed by any fixed rules
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tyrannical, despotic, oppressive or by caprice.26 The definition is
inclusive and incorporates both unintentional and intentional acts by
government. While this article does not necessarily advocate so broad
a definition for all purposes, the incorporation of both unintentional
and intentional acts here accurately represents the myriad ways in
which commentators and courts address concepts of arbitrariness
and recognizes that courts tend to conflate as arbitrary both
intentional acts of bias and prejudice as well as unintentional
irrational governmental actions.27
The article generally presumes that the administration of
or standard.") (internal citations omitted); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond
Accountability: Arbitrarinessand Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 461, 498 n.168 (2003) (explaining that administrative law uses the word
arbitrary to describe agency decisions that do not reflect reasoned deliberation and
therefore likely reflect improper influences) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Corp., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)); id. at 496 (finding that arbitrary
decision-making is irrational, unpredictable and unfair); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., The
Arbitrary Path of Due Process, 53 OKLA. L. REV. 197, 216 (2000) (grouping "capricious,
irrational and without 'fair, solid and substantial cause"' as one of two categories of
arbitrariness).
26. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 104 ("tyrannical; despotic"); Carmack, 329
U.S. at 243 n.14 (incorporating "by caprice" into its definition of arbitrary); Tepker,
supra note 25, at 216 (grouping "tyrannical, despotic or oppressive" as one of two
categories of arbitrariness).
27. Judicially imposed prohibitions on arbitrary government conduct contemplate
intentional and willful governmental actions in a variety of ways. In some contexts,
intentional governmental action must be shown in order to demonstrate arbitrariness.
See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 836 (1998) ('The issue in this
case is whether a police officer violates the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of
substantive due process by causing death through deliberate or reckless indifference to
life in a high-speed automobile chase aimed at apprehending a suspected offender. We
answer no, and hold that in such circumstances only a purpose to cause harm
unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitraryconduct
shocking to the conscience, necessary for a due process violation.") (emphasis added).
Other times, prohibitions on arbitrariness exist to prevent willfully unfair applications
of facially neutral statutes. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366-67 (1886)
(deeming a city ordinance "naked and arbitrary" because it gave supervisors
unfettered discretion and "power... granted to their mere will"). The Supreme Court
expressed its dissatisfaction with the ordinance by stating:
[t]hough the law itself be fair on its face, and impartial in appearance, yet, if
it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an
unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the
denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
Id. at 373-74. Also, where the government intentionally targets a particular person or
group without a legitimate government interest, such actions are deemed
impermissibly arbitrary. See, e.g., Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000) (recognizing "successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,'
where the plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from
others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in
treatment").
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welfare without rules or standards to guide bureaucratic action can
result in arbitrary decisions. I base this presumption upon the
analysis that, without rules, regulations, policies or procedures in
adequate
is without
decision-making
governmental
place,
actions
the
that
determining principle, that there is a significant risk
and
unfair,
and
of administrators will be irrational, unreasonable
as
tyrannical,
described
be
that the overall system can reasonably
despotic, oppressive and capricious. This article does not intend to
suggest that the use of discretionary decision-making by
administrative actors is inherently problematic.2s Nor does the article
suggest that the appropriate exercise of discretion is subversive of
our fundamental values. Instead, the article posits that the creation
and utilization of rules and standards is an important part of an
overall system in which the exercise of discretion is employed. The
purpose of this article is to examine the history of legal limits on
arbitrary governmental action, to illustrate existing constitutionally
based limits upon arbitrary governmental action, and to apply these
concepts to the current administration of welfare benefits.
Historically, concepts of non-arbitrariness extend back to the
Magna Carta,29 and a general repudiation of governmental
arbitrariness is evidenced in the many documents that form the
foundation of our current legal system. 30 The prohibition against
arbitrary governmental action also permeates modern constitutional
doctrines, including due process, equal protection and First
Amendment, as well as the topics of punitive damages, choice of
laws, vagueness, nondelegation and prosecutorial discretion.31 While

28. See Diller, supra note 19, at 1141-42 (explaining that all discretionary models
have some rules and all rule-based models have some degree of discretion) (citing
Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Inside the Welfare Contract:Discretion and Accountability in State
Welfare Administration, 71 Soc. SERV. REV. 1, 4 (1997) ("[D]iscretion is axiomatically
neither good nor bad but contingent on contextual conditions.")). See also GARY C.
BRYNER,

BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FEDERAL REGULATORY

AGENCIES 1-3 (1987) (stating that some discretion is an inevitable and often positive
characteristic of effective governance); JOEL F. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF
DISCRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAUCRACY 142-43 (1986) (reiterating the

notion that discretion is necessary and discussing the difficulty of tailoring that
discretion so as to avoid the potential for its abuse).
29. See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text.
31. These are not the only areas where prohibitions on arbitrary governmental
action exist. Broadly speaking I have limited the inquiry to constitutionally related
doctrines and domestic law areas. Thus, though concepts of non-arbitrariness exist in
the statutory context such as the Administrative Procedures Act, and in the
international law context, in the interest of space and brevity I specifically excluded
these areas from my analysis. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 825-26 (1985)
(explaining that there is "a general presumption that all agency decisions are
reviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act, at least to assess whether the
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courts acknowledge the existence of a limitation on arbitrary
governmental action in these areas, there is no definitive or unifying
judicial pronouncement of a prohibition on arbitrary governmental
action. In fact, courts have been reluctant to police arbitrariness in a
broad sense, in part because of the difficulty or impossibility32 of the
task.33
Despite these limitations, courts have used various doctrinal
tests to achieve the general goal of prohibiting arbitrary
governmental action. For example, in substantive due process
jurisprudence, courts limit arbitrary governmental action by
requiring that there be a rational relationship between the
government's ends and the means it employs. Similarly, courts
utilize the vagueness doctrine to limit arbitrary enforcement of laws
that are unclear and nonspecific, and employ due process
jurisprudence to limit grossly excessive, arbitrary punitive damages
awards. In the choice of law context, courts limit the arbitrary
application of a state's law by requiring that there be certain contacts
between the state, the parties and the dispute. The nondelegation
doctrine is designed to prevent arbitrary decision-making by
unelected and unresponsive administrative agents. Equal protection
jurisprudence prohibits the government from creating classifications
that arbitrarily treat similarly situated people differently. In the
context of prosecutorial discretion, equal protection doctrine is
applied to assure that a prosecutor's decision is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest and thus not arbitrary. Finally,

actions were arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion"); Kurt J. Hamrock, Note,
The ELSI Case: Toward an International Definition of 'Arbitrary" Conduct, 27 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 837 (1992) (exploring the meaning of "arbitrary" measures in a treaty).
Additionally, there are other constitutional law areas where concerns about
arbitrariness arise, including ex post facto legislation, Fourth Amendment, and death
penalty. Instead of addressing every possible constitutional law doctrine where
questions of arbitrariness arose, I examine several areas that illustrate the underlying
judicial concerns with government arbitrariness. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S.
269, 275-76 (1998) (stressing the need to limit the jury's discretion so that the death
penalty is not arbitrarily or capriciously imposed); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408,
411 (1997) (finding that the reasonableness of a governmental invasion "depends 'on a
balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free
from arbitrary interference by law officers") (citations omitted); Weaver v. Graham,
450 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1981) (finding that the prohibition of ex post facto laws "restricts
governmental power by restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation").
32. Jodi Wilgoren, Citing Issues of Fairness, Governor Clears Out Death Row in
Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at Al.
33. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review,
and ConstitutionalRemedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 310-11 (1993) (explaining that
courts have construed the substantive due process doctrine in a way to avoid the
overarching requirement of arbitrariness and instead focus on the adequacy of the
decision-making structures).
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First Amendment doctrine in part polices arbitrary, content-based,
limitations on free speech.
In each of the areas where courts regulate arbitrary
governmental action, underlying judicial concerns give rise to
jurisprudential principles. Four principles stand out. First, at a
minimum, there must be a rational relationship between the
government's ends and the means it chooses to reach those ends.
Second, clear standards must exist so that individuals are able to
conform their conduct according to a predictable system. Third, the
rules and standards that do exist must be equally and fairly applied.
And finally, the government must be accountable, and courts must be
able to review governmental action to determine its legality.
Applying these principles and concerns to the context of a
welfare system administered at the local level without rules,
regulations, policies or procedures, a number of conclusions can be
drawn. First, in the absence of any rules, regulations, policies or
procedures, there is no way to determine the existence of a rational
relation between the government's ends and the means it employs.
Second, in the absence of such rules and standards there can be
neither clarity nor predictability in the system, preventing individual
welfare recipients from conforming their behavior in a way that
creates or maintains eligibility for benefits. Third, without rules
there can be no assurance of equal or fair application of the rules,
creating the potential that similarly situated welfare recipients will
be treated differently. Finally, in the absence of visible and clear
rules there can be no accountability for administrative officials, and
courts will be unable to meaningfully review agency action to
determine legality. Thus, if courts were to regulate arbitrariness in
the welfare context similarly to other doctrinal areas, local
governments would, at a minimum, be required to create rational
rules and standards and to apply them fairly and equitably.
In section two, the article historically roots concepts of nonarbitrariness in the Magna Carta as well as in subsequent historic
documents and events. In section three, the article examines modern
doctrinal areas in which courts address the issue of arbitrariness,
identifying specific instances where courts regulate arbitrary
governmental conduct and examining the judicial concerns
underlying the proscriptions. This section concludes by grouping
these concerns into a set of principles that are applied in various
contexts to regulate arbitrary governmental action. Section four of
the article utilizes welfare reform as an example of one context in
which these principles could be used to regulate arbitrary
governmental action, exploring why the new model of welfare
administration results in increased governmental discretion and
examining some of the practical concerns raised by this change. The
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article proceeds to explain the ways in which neither constitutional
procedural due process or administrative law protections adequately
address the problems that exist when local governments operate
without rules, regulations, policies or procedures. The article
concludes by applying the set of principles derived from the analysis
in section three to the welfare context.
The article's primary goal is to demonstrate that the concept of
non-arbitrariness is foundational to American law and has some
relevance for a welfare program that is administered without rules or
standards. Specifically, the concept of non-arbitrariness and the
requirement of rules and standards that are fairly and equitably
applied create a necessary foundation from which other rights may
flow.34 Courts may not move toward a broad prohibition against

34. While I do recognize that the creation of rules and standards may be a
necessary first step, much more is required for the successful assertion of rights.
Further, there exist a number of barriers to the assertion of rights. See Michael
Lipsky, BureaucraticDisentitlement in Social Welfare Programs,58 SOC. SERV. REV. 3,
5 (1984) (discussing barriers to needy and eligible people getting the help they need
which include: a belief that he/she is not likely to be aided in such an endeavor, the
belief that asserting the right is not worth the cost, lack of knowledge of rights due to
administrator failure to inform, and a belief that success is unlikely). See also Jerry L.
Mashaw, Welfare Reform and Local Administration of Aid to Families with Dependant
Children in Virginia, 57 VA. L. REV. 818, 833 (1971) (recognizing the lack of knowledge
regarding both the rules and the rights provided under the welfare system as a
substantial obstacle to realization of those rights); Joel F. Handler, Discretion in Social
Welfare: The Uneasy Position in the Rule of Law, 92 YALE L.J. 1270, 1272-73 (1983).
The final cause of the ills of public assistance programs is the distribution of
wealth and power. One can never forget that the people we are talking about
are extremely dependent. They are ill-prepared to effectively participate in
public programs, and, in particular, to understand the procedural systems
designed to secure benefits and rights for them. The bureaucracy has control
over the information, the resources, the staying power, the power of
retaliation; workers, even if well-meaning, are pressed for time, short of
money, and, in all honesty, feel that they know what is best for the clients.
Discretion, in its lawful, positive sense (as distinguished from Professor
Mashaw's examples from Virginia), implies, at the minimum, a discussion, a
dialogue, a bargain of some sorts, a minimal sharing of power. But how are
the poor, the really dependent poor, to participate in these decisions? And if
they cannot cope when the administration of the program is benign and
supporting, imagine their situation when it is hostile, abusive, and
vindictive.
The old system of public assistance was predicated on
individualism, professionalism, and decentralization, but the caseload and
working conditions forced routinization at best, and chaos and arbitrariness
more often. In this situation, hostile attitudes toward the undeserving poor,
combined with extreme dependency, led to widespread abuses.
Handler, supra. Some argue that the most effective way to overcome such barriers to
welfare-dependant families actualizing their rights is to provide more formalized
procedural protections. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Two Wrongs Don't Add Up to Rights:
The Importance of PreservingDue Process in Light of Recent Welfare Reform Measures,
45 AM. U. L. REV. 1111, 1117 (1996) ("[Tlhe more formal the decision making process,
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arbitrary action affecting welfare recipients any time soon, but they
may be willing to regulate certain governmental action or inaction
through concepts of non-arbitrariness. Ultimately, the analysis
concludes that a welfare program being administered at the local
level without any rules, regulations, policies or procedures is an
instance where courts should be willing to regulate governmental
arbitrariness. The appropriate remedy would be one that traditional
constitutional procedural due process and administrative law
remedies have not clearly provided - namely, a requirement that
governments have rational rules and standards which are applied
fairly and equitably.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONCEPTS OF NON-ARBITRARINESS
This section examines the historical roots of the concept that
governments shall not act arbitrarily. Concepts of non-arbitrariness,
even though not expressly in the federal Constitution, are deeply
rooted in the historical development of our current system of justice.
As set forth below, the prohibition against arbitrary action can be
traced back to the Magna Carta with its concepts being invoked
throughout the various stages of our country's legal development,
from the American Revolution to the Federalist Papers, the Bill of
Rights and current discourse of numerous jurisprudential concepts.
Many of the specific prohibitions found in the Magna Carta have
been incorporated into our current constitutional scheme. Courts and
scholars also acknowledge that the Magna Carta was among the first
documents to specifically prohibit arbitrary governmental action and
that these concepts formed the basis of our current "rule of law"
values.
A. The Magna Carta
The concept of non-arbitrariness not only permeates the Magna
Carta, arbitrary governmental action was in fact at the root of its
creation. In 1215, facing a potential rebellion by his barons and
knights, King John signed the Magna Carta, in which he granted the
English nobility certain legal rights.35 The Magna Carta contains a
number of provisions that prohibit the royal and judicial authorities
from engaging in arbitrary actions. For example, sections of the
Magna Carta: prohibit the arbitrary taking of property;3 6 forbid the
the better chance the poorer, less educated party has to prevail.").
35. See Jeffrey Brauch & Robert Woods, Faith, Learning and Justice in Alan
Dershowitz's the Genesis of Justice: Toward a Proper Understanding of the
RelationshipBetween the Bible and Modern Justice, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 55 (2001).
36. "No constable or other of [o]ur bailiffs shall take corn or other chattels of any
man without immediate payment, unless the seller voluntarily consents to
postponement of payment." MAGNA CARTA ch. 28 (1215), reprinted in A.E. DICK
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arbitrary exercise of judicial power; 37 and guarantee application of
the doctrine of proportionality.38 Though never stating its direct
repudiation of arbitrary governmental action, the Magna Carta's
prohibition on arbitrary power is explicitly acknowledged vis-a-vis its
protection of people's liberties39 as well as its outline for the
administration of justice.40
The Magna Carta is considered by scholars and courts to be
among the first documents to have set forth in writing an
understanding of the relationship between a government and its
subjects that specifically prohibits arbitrary governmental action.
Legal scholars have traced the origin of the concept of nonarbitrariness to the Magna Carta41 and describe the Magna Carta as
HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 41 (1964). "No sheriff or other of
[o]ur bailiffs, or any other man, shall take the horses or carts of any free man for
carriage without the owner's consent." Id. ch. 30. "Neither [wie nor [olur bailiffs will
take another man's wood for [o]ur castles or for any other purpose without the owner's
consent." Id. ch. 31.
37. "[N]o bailiff shall upon his own unsupported accusation put any man to trial
without producing credible witnesses to the truth of the accusation." Id. ch. 38. "No
free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised [sic], outlawed, banished, or in any way
destroyed, nor will [w]e proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful
judgment of his peers by the law of the land." Id. ch. 39. "To no one will [w]e sell, to
no one will [wie deny or delay, right or justice." Id. ch. 40.
38. "A free man shall be amerced for a small fault only according to the measure
Id.
thereof, and for a great crime according to its magnitude, saving his position ....
ch. 20. For a definition of the doctrine of proportionality in its contemporary
application to the realm of international law, see Michael C. Bonafede, Note, Here,
There, and Everywhere: Assessing the ProportionalityDoctrine and U.S. Uses of Force
in Response to TerrorismAfter the September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155, 168
(2002).
39. MAGNA CARTA, chs. 28, 30-31.
40. Id. chs. 38-40.
41. Brauch & Woods, supra note 35, at 55 ("Many of the Magna Carta's provisions
required the king to end arbitrary royal actions that were very time and culture
specific. [King John] agreed, for instance, to not steal the corn, wood, carts, and horses
of his nobles. But John also agreed to some broad provisions that formed the basis for
due process and the rule of law."); Randall Green, Human Rights and Most-FavoredNation Tariff Rates for Products from the People's Republic of China, 17 U. PUGET
SOUND L. REV. 611, 628 (1994) ("[I]n June 1215 certain barons in England forcefully
negotiated the first issue of the Magna Carta with King John. They sought to
ameliorate the arbitrary and extortionate methods of taxation being used at that time
for supporting the King's foreign wars, to protect themselves from the ruthless and
brutal reprisals against tax defaulters, and to provide redress for wrongs suffered.");
Timothy L. Hall, Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil Communion, and the
Establishment Clause, 79 IOWA L. REV. 35, 49 n.77 (1993) (quoting MAGNA CARTA, ch.
33) ("The Magna Carta's attempt to create a bulwark against arbitrary government
dedicated itself 'to the honor of God, and the exaltation of Holy Church."'); Brian L.
Lahargoue, Comment, The Need for Federal Legislative Reform of Punitive Damages,
20 Sw. U.L. REV. 103, 105 (1991) ("[A] magistrate over all the King's subjects,
exercising arbitrary power, violating the Magna Carta, and attempting to destroy the
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being established and valued for its prohibition against arbitrary
government power. 42 Indeed, it stands at its very core for the
principle that the government cannot act in an arbitrary manner
against the people.43 Many scholars link the Magna Carta's concepts
liberty of the kingdom by insisting upon the legality of this general warrant before
them; they heard the King's Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the Treasury
endeavoring to support and maintain the legality of the warrant in a tyrannical and
severe manner.").
42. Raoul Berger, Doctor Bonham's Case: Statutory Construction or Constitutional
Theory?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 521, 535 (1969) ("[S]tates Gough, 'Fundamental laws (and
Magna Carta itself) were valued for the protection they afforded against the arbitrary
power of kings."'); George Anastaplo, Individualism, Professional Ethics, and the Sense
of Community: From Runnymede to a London Telephone Booth, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
285, 286 (1996) ("Magna Carta established the freedom of the Church of England,
protected free men from the arbitrary use of royal power."); Melody A. Hamel, Recent
Decisions, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 985, 992 ("[Ilmportant guarantees of the Magna Carta
included protection from arbitrary government confiscation of property."); Bernard H.
Siegan, Propter Honoris Respectum: Separationof Powers and Economic Liberties, 70
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 415, 419 (1995) ('The Magna Carta did not deprive the king and
his agents of all powers but only of arbitrary power over life, liberty and property.");
John Norton Moore, The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the
Rule of Law, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 645, 645 (1995) ("[Mjuch of the world's
history of human progress has been a struggle to control arbitrary power. This
struggle... began with the Magna Carta ....");Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due
Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941, 953, 969 ('The Magna Carta, then, was
intended as a limit upon the king. Chapter 39 was not directed to his 'legislative'
functions, if they could be distinguished, but to 'the arbitrary acts of imprisonment,
disseisin, and outlawry in which King John had indulged.... ' Given the common
perception of Magna Carta as a protection against arbitrary government, it is not
surprising that the colonists also resorted to the Great Charter in their controversies
with king and Parliament, particularly over the right to tax."); Robert Lincoln,
Executive Decisionmaking by Local Legislatures in Florida: Justice, Judicial Review
and the Need for Legislative Reform, 25 STETSON L. REV. 627, 675 n.243 (1996) ("The
principle that arbitrary or capricious action is outside the power of the sovereign has
its roots in the Magna Carta and was discussed extensively by Locke.").
43. John Marquez Lundin, The Law of Equality Before Equality Was Law, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1137, 1155 n.71 (1999) (citing Harold J. Berman, The Origins of
HistoricalJurisprudence: Coke, Seldon, Hale, 103 YALE L.J. 1651, 1687 (1994)) ("The
language of Magna Carta was invoked as a symbol of the restriction of the arbitrary
exercise of power."); Rob Cronan, Book Note, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287, 288 n.8
(2000) (reviewing PAUL CRAIG ROBERTS & LAWRENCE M. STRATTON, THE TYRANNY OF
GOOD INTENTIONS: How PROSECUTORS AND BUREAUCRATS ARE TRAMPLING THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE (2000)) ("The Rights of Englishmen are a set
of legal principles that ensure that the law protects people from arbitrary government
power. These Rights of Englishmen originated with the Magna Carta in England and
had the effect of empowering the people."); Jane Rutherford, The Myth of Due Process,
72 B.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1992) ("The barons, like Robin Hood, were concerned with
arbitrary seizures of people, property, and wealth. Because the barons were rich
themselves, however, they were reluctant to redistribute wealth. Instead, they forced
King John to limit his powers by adopting Magna Carta in 1215. In this manner,
Magna Carta replaced Robin Hood as the guardian of the individual against the forces
of arbitrary government.").
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of non-arbitrariness to current rule of law concepts. 44 Likewise,
Supreme Court Justices have noted that the Magna Carta was
designed to secure individuals against the arbitrary power of
government and that the Magna Carta is the basis of our current
concept of the rule of law.45
Since 1819, the courts have affirmed that the Magna Carta was
"intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of
private rights and distributive justice."46 Many of the specific
prohibitions originally set forth in the Magna Carta have been
incorporated into the United States' constitutional scheme. For
example, a considerable number of courts have argued that the
concept of "due process of law," as written in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, was born in the text of the Magna Carta.
The specific clause identified as enunciating the concept of "due
process of law" is as follows: "[nlo free man shall be taken,
imprisoned, disseised [sic], outlawed, banished, or in any way
destroyed, nor will [wie proceed against or prosecute him, except by

44. Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 303, 307 (2001) ('This notion of reasoned judgment, as opposed to
arbitrary abuse of power, is at the core of the notion of the rule of law and has roots
that can be traced back to the Magna Carta."); Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before
Answers: The Ongoing Search to Understandthe Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 1005, 1011 (2001) ("England's emergence as a country governed by the
rule of law rather than by the despotic and arbitrary power of a monarch lay in the
principle, suggested in Magna Carta and made explicit by Coke, that Parliament,
rather than the King's ministers, makes the law.").
45. Sandra Day O'Connor, Proceedings of the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the
American Society of InternationalLaw: Keynote Address, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
348, 351 (2002) ("To the Western world of law, the great gift of the Magna Carta,
signed in 1215, was the notion that no person, including the sovereign, is above the
law and that all persons shall be secure from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of
government. The Magna Carta is the spiritual and legal ancestor of the concept of the
rule of law."); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) ("This constitutional concern [a reasonableness standard for judicial
determination of a punitive damages amount], itself harkening back to the Magna
Carta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or
property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of arbitrary
coercion.") (emphasis added).
46. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235, 244 (1819) (noting that the idea of
protecting the individual from the arbitrary exercise of governmental power originates
with the Magna Carta). See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 272 (1994) (arguing
that "the words 'by the law of the land' from the Magna Carta were 'intended to secure
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government"'); BrowningFerris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 270-71 (1989) ("The
barons who forced John to agree to Magna Carta sought to reduce arbitrary royal
power, and in particular to limit the King's use of amercements as a source of royal
revenue, and as a weapon against enemies of the Crown.").
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the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land."47 The
original Latin version of the Magna Carta, issued in 1215, employed
the term "per legem terrae," meaning "law of the land," and it was
subsequently understood by courts to mean "due process of law."48
Additionally, courts have held that the words of the Magna Carta
were intended to prevent the King from arresting individuals without
a warrant49 and from prosecuting an individual twice for the same
crime. 50 These prohibitions were incorporated into the Fourths1 and
MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39.
48. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847
(1992) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961)) ("[T]he guaranties of due
process, though having their roots in Magna Carta's 'per legem terrae' and considered
as procedural safeguards 'against executive usurpation and tyranny,' have in this
country 'become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation."'); E. Enter. v. Apfel, 524
U.S. 498, 558-59 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ('"To find that the Due Process Clause
protects against this kind of fundamental unfairness-that it protects against an
unfair allocation of public burdens through this kind of specially arbitrary retroactive
means-is to read the Clause in light of a basic purpose: the fair application of law,
which purpose hearkens back to the Magna Carta."); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 384
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Our ancestors' ancestors had known the tyranny of the
kings and the rule of man and it was, in my view, in order to insure against such
actions that the Founders wrote into our own Magna Carta the fundamental principle
of the rule of law, as expressed in the historically meaningful phrase 'due process of
law."'); Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855) ("The
words 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as
the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Charta [sic]. Lord Coke, in his
commentary on those words says 'they mean due process of law."'). See also Edward 0.
Correia, Moral Reasoning and the Due Process Clause, 3 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 529,
536 n.28 (1994) ("Early due process cases interpreted the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to be a restatement of the Magna Carta's guarantee against
arbitrary actions by government.").
49. State v. Mobley, 83 S.E.2d 100, 102 (N.C. 1954) ("Ain arrest without warrant
is deemed unlawful ....This foundation principle of the common law, designed and
intended to protect the people against the abuses of arbitrary arrests, is of ancient
origin. It derives from assurances of Magna Carta and harmonizes with the spirit of
our constitutional precepts that the people should be secure in their persons.").
50. State v. Bowen, 224 N.J. Super. 263, 273 (App. Div. 1988) ("No one currently
disputes the great worth of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy. The
prohibition is of ancient origin and was one of the principal limitations upon arbitrary
power confirmed by the Magna Carta of 1215."); State v. Labato, 80 A.2d 617, 620
(N.J. 1951) ("It is an ancient principle of the common law that one may not be twice
put in jeopardy for the same offense. This is one of the limitations upon arbitrary
power confirmed by King John's Magna Charta of 1215, in the provision (c. 29)
ensuring the essentials of individual right and justice and the ancient liberties of the
freeman against interference 'but by lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the
land."').
51. William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the "PerSe" Rule: Justice
Stewart's Struggle to Preserve the FourthAmendment's Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 1013, 1020 n.26 (1994) (noting that the "[o]bject of [Clause 39] was to prevent
in the future all such extra-legal procedure, to affirm the validity of feudal law and
custom against arbitrary caprice and the indiscriminate use of force, and to prohibit
47.
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Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Furthermore,
according to courts and scholars, the Sixth and Eighth Amendments
to the Constitution were directly founded upon the Magna Carta's
rejection of arbitrariness.52 In addition to the impact the document
has had in this country, the Magna Carta has also formed the basis
of other countries' protections against the arbitrary acts of
government. 53
constituted authority from placing execution before judgment"); Elizabeth A. Faulkner,
The Right to Habeas Corpus: Only in the Other Americas, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
653, 654 n.4 (1994) ("The concept of freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention
appeared in several early European documents, such as the Magna Carta, the Habeas
Corpus Acts of England, and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the
Citizen.").
52. Hoskins v. Wainwright, 485 F.2d 1186, 1189 (5th Cir. 1973) ("'[Tjhe accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial'... [this right] found expression in
the Magna Carta, Coke's, Institutes, and the Sixth Amendment .. "); Nina Lempert,
Note & Comment, Punitive Damages - The Dischargeability Debate Continues, 11
BANKR. DEV. J. 707, 712 n.26 (1994-95) ("In order to regulate the arbitrary imposition
of amercements, which were awarded at the judge's discretion, several provisions of
the Magna Carta were enacted to control abuses by the courts. The provisions of the
Magna Carta required that there be a rational connection between the punishment
and the infraction, and that the fine imposed should not destroy the defendant's means
of earning a living in his occupation. The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which forbids excessive fines, was founded on those stipulations of the
Magna Carta.").
Law scholars have also traced the origin of the doctrine of non-arbitrariness to the
Magna Carta. Deana M. Hartley has noted:
As a result of the arbitrary manner in which the courts imposed
Consequently, several
amercements, abuses developed in the system.
provisions of the Magna Carta addressed limiting the amount of such
penalties. Those sections of the Magna Carta 'required that there be a
reasonable, proportional and sensible relationship between punishment and
offense, and that the penalty exacted should not destroy the offender's means
of making a living in his trade.' The Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution forbidding excessive penalties was modeled after those
sections of the Magna Carta.
Deana M. Hartley, Torts - The Constitutionalityof Punitive Damages in Wyoming: Can
We Effectively Eliminate Brow-Raising Verdicts? (Farmers Insurance v. Shirley, 958 P.
2d 1040 (Wyo. 1998)), 34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 213, 216 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
53. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of Criminal Justice:
Identifying "International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in
National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 259-60 (1993) ("The protection
against the arbitrary deprivation of freedom is expressed in the Magna Carta, the Bill
of Rights of the United States Constitution, and the French Declaration of the Rights
of Man.") (footnotes omitted); David Clark, The Icon of Liberty: The Status and Role of
Magna Carta in Australian and New ZealandLaw, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 866, 869 n.12,
887 n.128 (2000) (quoting Mabo v. Queensland, (1988) 166 CLR 186, 226) ('Thus, the
rejection of arbitrary detention in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 22 is
said also to be supported by Magna Carta. .. 'long-established notions of justice that
can be traced back at least to the guarantee of Magna Carta [1297] against the
arbitrary disseisin of feehold."') (alteration in original).
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B. Other Historic Documents and Events
Subsequent to the creation of the Magna Carta, other documents
evidence this same repudiation of governmental arbitrariness. For
example, some four hundred years later, during the Glorious
Revolution in England, King William and Queen Mary were required
to sign the English Bill of Rights, which limited the royal family's
powers by including a prohibition on the arbitrary suspension of
Parliament's laws.54 Former King James II was expelled, among
other reasons, for prosecuting "in the Court of King's Bench...
matters and causes cognizable only in Parliament, and by diverse
other arbitrary and illegal courses ... [and for] assuming and
exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and the
execution of laws, without consent of parliament. . . ."55 Thus, as
with the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights sought to prohibit
the governing authority from engaging in arbitrary conduct.
Similarly, a major theme of the American Revolution was the
colonists' disdain for arbitrary power. During the First Continental
Congress in 1774, representatives of twelve colonies issued a
"Declaration of Rights and Grievances" in response to the British
Parliament's passage of the "Intolerable Acts."56 The representatives
claimed to be "justly alarmed at these arbitrary proceedings of
parliament and administration [i.e., the Intolerable Acts], have
severally elected, constituted, and appointed deputies to meet, and
sit in general Congress, in the city of Philadelphia, in order to obtain
such establishment, as that their religion, laws, and liberties, may
not be subverted."57
The American colonists' rejection of arbitrary power also wove its
way into the Declaration of Independence which accuses the English
King of making "[j]udges dependent on his [w]ill alone, for the
[tenure of their [o]ffices, and the [a]mount and [payment of their
[sjalaries."58 Thus, the text reveals that the American revolutionaries
objected to an exercise of power that was subject to individual will or
judgment without restriction.59 The colonists also accuse the King of
54.

ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1689, 1 W. & M., sess. 1, c. 2; see also

DUHAIME.ORG, LAW MUSEUM, at http://www.duhaime.org/Law-museum/uk-billr.aspx

(last visited Mar. 31, 2005) (noting effects of passage of English Bill of Rights).
55. ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS OF 1689, 1 W. & M., sess. 1, c. 2.
56. THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS AND GRIEVANCES, at http://www.usconstitution.
net/ intol.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2005).
57. Id.
58. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, available at http://www.archives.gov/
(last visited Mar.
national archives-experience/charters/declaration_transcript.htm
31, 2005) [hereinafter DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE].
59. See id. ('The history of the present King of Great Britian is a history of
repeated injuries and usurpations ... establish[ing] an absolute Tyranny over these
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"abolishing the free [slystem of English [1]aws in a neighbouring
[p]rovince,60 establishing therein an arbitrary [g]overnment, and
enlarging its [b]oundaries, so as to render it at once an [e]xample and
fit [i]nstrument for introducing the same absolute [r]ules into these
[c]olonies .... "61 These repudiations of arbitrary government in the
Declaration of Independence reflect the themes at the root of their
grievance, and at the foundation of the American Revolution.
Several prominent authors of the Federalist Papers specifically
objected to arbitrary governmental actions. In Federalist No. 47,
James Madison argued that fusing legislative and executive powers
would jeopardize citizens' life and liberty, because such a fusion of
power would lead to "arbitrary control."62 Likewise, in Federalist No.
78, Alexander Hamilton argued that in order to prevent the courts
from having arbitrary discretion, judges "should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents."63 These documents point to the founders'
64
fear of the inherent despotic nature of arbitrary power.
Thus, concepts of non-arbitrariness stem back to the Magna
Carta which was created in large part to provide citizens protection
against the arbitrary will of the King. This concept of nonarbitrariness was central to the American colonists' movement to
secure individuals against government lawlessness and have been
noted by courts and scholars alike.
III. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE REGULATION OF ARBITRARY ACTION

Modern American jurisprudence contains myriad limitations on
arbitrary action by government officials. This section identifies and
explores these limitations on arbitrary governmental action found in
current constitutional jurisprudence. Specifically, the section focuses
on concepts of non-arbitrariness that do not rely upon the finding of a
constitutionally protected property interest65 or the application of
states.").
60. The province referred to is Quebec, recently surrendered by France.
61. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, supra note 58.
62. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (citing Montesquieu).
63. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
64. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Hamilton notes that he
"cannot readily discern the inseparable connection between the existence of liberty,
and the trial by jury in civil cases. Arbitrary impeachments, arbitrarymethods of
prosecuting pretended offences, and arbitrarypunishments upon arbitraryconvictions,
have ever appeared to me to be the great engines of judicial despotism ......
(emphasis added).
65. Of course, courts use procedural due process doctrine to police arbitrary
government deprivations of property. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) ("It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to
protect those claims upon which people rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not
be arbitrarily undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to
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statutory protections under Administrative Procedure Acts. Instead,
the limitations examined emanate from broad constitutional
doctrines, such as due process and equal protection, as well as from
more specific constitutional provisions such as the First Amendment.
Upon review, a number of themes emerge from these otherwise
distinct substantive law doctrines. These themes revolve around
judicial concern about fundamental concepts of rationality, clarity,
predictability, fairness, equality, accountability and reviewability.
Some scholars have characterized such themes as closely
provide an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims."). Courts also use
procedural due process to police arbitrary deprivations of liberty. See, e.g., Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) ("The [procedural] Due Process Clause also forbids
arbitrary deprivations of liberty.") (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433,
437 (1971)). The historical evolution of due process jurisprudence into its procedural
and substantive components is replete with court concerns about policing arbitrary
governmental action. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 124 (1889) ('The
great purpose of the [due process] requirement is to exclude everything that is
arbitrary and capricious in legislation affecting the rights of the citizen.").
Furthermore, the right to notice and a hearing in instances of government
deprivations is axiomatic in procedural due process jurisprudence. See Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("There can be no doubt
that at a minimum they require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
nature of the case."); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965) (articulating that
such notice and hearings "must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner"). Procedural due process notice and hearing requirements prevent arbitrary
property and liberty deprivations to preserve fairness. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 81 (1971) ("The constitutional right to be heard is a basic aspect of the duty of
government to follow a fair process of decisionmaking when it acts to deprive a person
Its purpose, more particularly, is to protect his use and
of his possessions ....
possession of property from arbitrary encroachment-to minimize substantively unfair
The requirement of notice and an
or mistaken deprivations of property ....
opportunity to be heard raises no impenetrable barrier to the taking of a person's
possessions. But the fair process of decision-making that it guarantees works, by
itself, to protect against arbitrary deprivation of property."); Gorman v. Univ. of R.I.,
837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Hence, the procedures employed in a disciplinary action
must be tested by the extent to which they comport with the requirement of
fundamental fairness.") (citing William G. Buss, ProceduralDue Process For School
Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 551 (1971));
Dixon v. Ala. State Bd. Of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that
government power to expel students from school "cannot be arbitrarily exercised" and
should be restricted by fundamental principles of fairness by giving the accused
students notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard in their own defense).
In a welfare context, see White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753 (7th Cir. 1976) ("[D]ue
process requires that welfare assistance be administered to ensure fairness and
freedom from arbitrary decision-making as to eligibility."); Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d
230, 232 (7th Cir. 1978) ("In the context of eligibility for welfare assistance, due
process requires at least that the assistance program be administered in such a way as
to insure fairness and to avoid the risk of arbitrary decision making."); Baker-Chaput
v. Gordon Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134, 1140 (D.N.H. 1976) ("The absence of standards
creates a void in which malice, vindictiveness, intolerance or prejudice can fester.").
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corresponding to the premises of liberal legalism.66 These concerns
give rise to a set of four legal principles. First, a rational relationship
must exist between the government's ends and the means it employs.
Second, laws must be clear enough to create a predictable system.
Third, laws must be equitably and fairly applied. And, fourth, there
must be a means to hold government accountable and to ensure
reviewability of agency action.
This section begins with a discussion of due process and the
various substantive areas where due process serves to limit arbitrary
action including vagueness, punitive damages and choice of law. The
article then proceeds to discuss limitations on governmental action in
the following contexts: nondelegation, equal protection and First
Amendment. In each area, both the general limitations placed upon
arbitrary governmental action as well as the thematic judicial
concerns that underlie these limitations are considered. The section
concludes with a discussion of the fundamental principles of nonarbitrariness.
A. Modern JurisprudentialConcepts of Arbitrariness
1. The Due Process Clause
a. Substantive Due Process
One of the fundamental purposes of the Due Process Clause is to
protect individuals from arbitrary governmental action, "whether the
fault lies in a denial of fundamental procedural fairness, .. . or in the
exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service
of a legitimate governmental objective. . . ."67 Despite the apparently
66. Cynthia R. Farina, Conceiving Due Process, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 189, 24344 (1991) (describing the assumptions that have been characterized as the classic
premises of liberal legalism). Specifically, the legal system supports the themes of
rationality and predictability by creating laws that are comprehensible and predictable
so that individuals can engage in rational decision-making. The legal system also
supports the themes of equality, fairness and uniformity by creating laws that are
general, impersonal and objective. Finally, the legal system supports themes of
accountability and reviewability by creating a system that is determinate, stable and
calcuable so that the boundaries of the law have clear import. Id. (citing JERRY L.
MASHAW, DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 267 (1985)); Jerry L. Mashaw,

Dignitary Process:A PoliticalPsychology of Liberal Democratic Citizenship, 39 U. FLA.
L. REV. 433, 439-40 (1987) [hereinafter Mashaw, Dignitary Process]; Frank
Michelman, ProceduralDue Processof Law, Civil, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1472 (Leonard Levy et al. eds., 1986).
67. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1998) (citing Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972)) (explaining that the procedural Due Process Clause
protects against arbitrary takings). For support that protections against arbitrary
action come from the Magna Carta, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994);
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986); Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. 235,
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broad purpose behind the due process clause, courts appear reluctant
to embrace expansive due process limitations and have historically
struggled with the proper confines of the clause.68 However, two
areas of substantive due process jurisprudence have continually
addressed concerns of arbitrariness. First, courts regulate arbitrary
governmental action when there exists no rational relationship
between the government's ends and the means it employs. This
limitation is rooted in notions of rationality and requires that the
government not utilize arbitrary or irrational justifications for laws.
Courts will also regulate governmental action that is so arbitrary or
oppressive that it "shocks the conscience" of the court. This limitation
is rooted in the court's concerns about fairness - namely, government
should not be permitted to engage in acts of arbitrariness or
oppression.69
The rational basis test serves as a constitutional floor ensuring
legislation bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest.70 If the legislation bears no rational relationship to the
purported governmental interest, it is viewed as arbitrary and thus
violative of the substantive Due Process Clause.71 In one of the
244 (1819) (drawing from the voice of the Magna Carta, that an individual is secure
from "the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice").
68. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ("As a general
matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area
are scarce and open-ended.") (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,
225-26 (1985)); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("Substantive
due process has at times been a treacherous field for this Court. There are risks when
the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without
the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. As the history of the
Lochner era demonstrates, there is reason for concern lest the only limits to such
judicial intervention become the predilections of those who happen at the time to be
Members of this Court.").
69. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
70. Id. at 631-33 (holding that a law prohibiting all legislative, judicial, or
executive action protecting homosexual persons from discrimination did not bear a
rational relation to a legitimate governmental purpose); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,
319-21 (1993) (upholding a state statute requiring a lesser standard for involuntary
civil commitment of "mentally retarded" individuals than mentally ill individuals);
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (upholding a statute that
disallowed vendors who had not continually conducted business for eight years from
selling in the French Quarter); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973) (overturning a statute that prevented any members of a household with an
individual unrelated to other members of the household from receiving food stamps).
71. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 676 (1976)
(acknowledging that substantive due process proscriptions dictate that a state or local
legislative measure is judicially voidable if it is "arbitrary and capricious, bearing no
relation to the police power"); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938) ("Even in the absence of such aids the existence of facts supporting the
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leading land use cases, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
where regulations are "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no
substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare" they violate the substantive Due Process Clause.72 While the
Court upheld the land use regulation at issue in that case, it created
a standard to assure that government regulations were rationally
related to a legitimate purpose.7 3 Similarly, in the housing context,
the Court found that the justifications or means offered by the city
for a housing ordinance, while legitimate, were not rationally related
to the ordinance and thus violated substantive due process.
Specifically, the Court held that an ordinance preventing a
grandmother from living with her two grandsons was not rationally
related to the articulated governmental interests in preventing
overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion and
avoiding undue financial burden on the school system. 74 This lack of
rational relation was considered by the Court to be arbitrary and
thus a violation of the substantive Due Process Clause.75 In another
case involving land use changes, the Court acknowledged that "[i]f
the substantive result of the referendum [was] arbitrary and
capricious [and bore] no relation to the police power," then the
referendum would be invalid pursuant to substantive due process
limitations.76 While in most instances any conceivable legitimate
government interest would be sufficient to overcome the finding of

legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary
commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of
the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the
assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators."); W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937)
('%iberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily subject to the restraints of due
process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in
the interests of the community is due process."). See also Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d
1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding that discrimination against a public university
professor on the basis of sex "constitutes an arbitrary and capricious deprivation of the
individual's liberty interest in not being terminated for a constitutionally
impermissible purpose"); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1976)
(finding academic dismissals from state institutions can be enjoined if "shown to be
clearly arbitrary and capricious"); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975)
(finding that if the decision is about academic standards courts will only intervene if
the decision was arbitrary).
72. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
73. Id.

74.

Moore, 431 U.S. at 499-500.

75. See id. at 502 (noting that the Court's substantive due process history "does not
counsel abandonment, nor does it require what the city urges here: cutting off any
protection of family rights at the first convenient, if arbitrary boundary ... of the
nuclear family").
76. City of Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 676.
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arbitrariness,77 the Court has clearly delineated in its substantive
due process jurisprudence a foundational limitation that prohibits
the most arbitrary governmental actions.78
The Court also uses substantive due process doctrine to limit
arbitrary governmental action that is so arbitrary or oppressive that
it shocks the conscience of the court. The "shock the conscience" test
was first employed in the 1951 case Rochin v. California,as a way to
define what constitutes arbitrary governmental action.79 The Court
found that the action of a police officer who unlawfully entered the
defendant's home, assaulted him and ordered a hospital physician to
pump his stomach, rose to the level of conscience-shocking behavior
that violated the substantive Due Process Clause.80 In so holding, the
Court found the actions of the police "too close to the rack and the
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation" and concluded that
such action was so brutal and offensive that it failed to comport with
traditional ideas of "fair play and decency."81 The test has been
interpreted to limit certain governmental actions, "regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them," and thus serves
to prevent government from using its power in an oppressive
fashion.82
While the "shock the conscience" test is still acknowledged as
valid law, its restriction on arbitrary governmental action has been
limited in several ways. These limitations, in part, represent the
Court's discomfort with the vague, open-ended nature of trying to
define "arbitrariness" in the constitutional sense.8 3 First, the Court

77. See Curto v. City of Harper Woods, 954 F.2d 1237, 1243 (6th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a governmental regulation is valid if it advances a legitimate
governmental interest or if it is not an unreasonable means of advancing such an
interest) (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla. Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955)
("But the law need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it
might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct
it.")).
78. See, e.g., Lyng v. Int'l Union, 485 U.S. 360 (1988); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
79. 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
80. Id. at 166-67, 173-74.
81. Id. at 172-73.
82. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986).
83. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("[Tioday's opinion resuscitates the ne plus ultra, the Napoleon Brandy,
the Mahatma Gandhi, the Cellophane of subjectivity, th' ol' 'shocks-the-conscience'
test. According to today's opinion, [the 'shocks-the-conscience' test] is the measure of
arbitrariness when what is at issue is executive, rather than legislative, action.");
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ("As a general matter, the
Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process
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limited the "shock the conscience" substantive due process standard
to only those instances where no other more-specific constitutional
provision governed the issue.84 The Court also limited the doctrine to
non-negligent actions of a government official,85 finding that the Due
Process Clause was intended to secure an individual from an abuse of
power by government officials rather than from mere lack of care or
negligence.S6 Despite this limitation, the Court acknowledged that
due process is intended to protect the individual against arbitrary
governmental action and that "by barring certain governmental
actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to
implement them.. . [due process] serves to prevent governmental
power from being 'used for the purposes of oppression."'7 Finally, the
Court created a distinction between executive and legislative action
in the context of substantive due process.8S Specifically, the Court
acknowledged that executive abuse of power is cognizable when the
action "shocks the conscience of the court," but found that "only the
most egregious official conduct can be said to be 'arbitrary in the
constitutional sense."'89 The Court continues to adhere to the "shock
the conscience" standard as a way to ensure a limitation on arbitrary
or oppressive governmental conduct.90

because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce
and open-ended.") (citing Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225-26
(1985) (stating that judges who review the substance of a genuinely academic decision
"should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment")).
84. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that because the Fourth
Amendment provides explicit "textual source of constitutional protection against [the
conduct at issue], that Amendment, not the more generalized notions of 'substantive
due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims").
85. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 335-36; see also Collins, 503 U.S. at 130 (affirming the
Daniels holding by barring a substantive due process claim on the basis of a city's
failure to provide adequate training for its employees).
86. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 332 (finding that the action of prison custodians who left a
pillow on the stairs that led to injury is far from an example of government abuse of
power).
87. Id. (citing Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272,
277 (1856)).
88. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-49.
89. Id. at 846 (citing Collins, 503 U.S. at 129) (explaining that "criteria to identify
what is fatally arbitrary differ depending on whether it is legislation or a specific act of
a governmental officer that is at issue"). In the context of executive action "only the
most egregious official conduct can be said to be arbitrary in the constitutional case."
Id. The court acknowledges the cognizable level of executive abuse of power as that
which shocks the conscience. However, the court elaborates on the test by explaining
that in determining whether an executive action is egregious enough to shock the
conscience, courts may consider "a history of liberty protection," "traditional executive
behavior," "contemporary practice," and "standards generally applied to them." Id. at
847-48 n.8.
90. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (acknowledging that the
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The precise scope of protection against arbitrary action afforded
by the substantive Due Process Clause is a subject of much debate.91
Some courts and scholars construe the substantive Due Process
Clause protection against arbitrary governmental action broadly.92
For example, in Poe v. Ullman, Justice Harlan reasoned that
substantive due process protections included a "freedom from all
substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,"
regardless of whether the imposition abridged a specific express
constitutional right.93 Likewise, in Hurtado v. California,the Court,
ruling on a criminal defendant's right to a grand jury indictment,
held that the substantive Due Process Clause should be construed as
an evolving concept under which arbitrary action by the government
is impermissible.94
Some scholars also view the substantive Due Process Clause as
including broad protection against arbitrary governmental action.
Professor Richard Fallon explains that "[i]n its commonest form,

Due Process
conscience").

Clause

protects

against

governmental

action

that

"shocks

the

91. Some commentators refer to the substantive Due Process Clause as a doctrine
that "subsists in confusion." See Fallon, supra note 33, at 309. Others note the
"uncertainty and subjectivity of the Court's constitutional analysis of substantive due
process." Tepker, supra note 25, at 205. Judge Posner states that substantive due
process "stinks in the nostrils of modern liberals and modern conservatives alike,
because of its association with Dred Scott's case and with Lochner and the other
freedom of contract cases, because of its formlessness, ... and because it makes a poor
match with the right to notice and hearing that is the procedural content of the
clause." RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 179-80 (1995).
92. See Fallon, supra note 33, at 310 ("Substantive due process doctrine reflects
the simple but far-reaching principle... that government [action] cannot be
arbitrary... and there must be a 'rational' or reasonable relationship between [the]
government's end and its means."); Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 (stating that the
"touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of
government.., by barring certain governmental actions regardless of the fairness of
the procedures used to implement them, [due process], serves to prevent governmental
power from being 'used for the purposes of oppression').
93.

367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan further noted:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot
be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 'liberty' is not a series of
isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of
speech, press, and religion; the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom
from unreasonable searches and seizures; and so on.
It is a rational
continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, and which also recognizes,
what a reasonable and sensitive judgement must, that certain interests
require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify
their abridgment.

Id.
94.

110 U.S. 516, 530-31, 536, 538 (1884).
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substantive due process doctrine reflects the simple but far-reaching
principle-also embodied in the Equal Protection Clause-that
government cannot be arbitrary."95 He finds that the overwhelming
task of giving content to this basic principle of non-arbitrariness has
resulted in a series of avoidance techniques by the Supreme Court.96
Thus, he argues, the Due Process Clause is more complex than it
might appear on the surface and that the doctrine is not susceptible
to a basic set of principles or clearly applicable categories.97 Rather,
substantive due process adjudication:
occurs along a continuum ... [that] is marked less by interests
varying in their fundamentality than by judicial precedents and
by what the Supreme Court takes to be widely shared intuitions
or principles that impose duties on government and define
standards of reasonableness that constrain governmental
pursuit even of acceptable goals.98
In contrast, other courts and scholars view the substantive Due
Process Clause as much more limited in scope, protecting against
arbitrary action only when certain fundamental liberty interests are
at issue. Adherents of this more limited view of the substantive Due
Process Clause argue that when claiming an arbitrary deprivation of
a non-fundamental liberty interest, substantive due process does not
provide protection and individuals must instead look to the Equal
Protection Clause as the available source of protection.99 For
example, Justice Black expressly disagreed with Justice Harlan's
view that the substantive Due Process Clause proscribes all arbitrary
governmental action, instead advocating that protections do not
extend beyond the specific provisions set forth in the Bill of Rights.loo
This more limited view of the protections afforded by the substantive
Due Process Clause has been adopted recently by Justice Scalia in
his concurrence in City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community
Hope Foundation,in which he argues that only those arbitrary and
capricious governmental actions that impact a "fundamental liberty

95. Fallon, supra note 33, at 310. Fallon notes that substantive due process's
"animating commitment can be expressed only in terms that are duly open ended. But
that commitment is captured by perhaps the most persistently recurring theme in due
process cases: government must not be arbitrary." Id. at 322-23.
96. Id. at 310, 339-40.
97. Id. at 322-23.
98. Id. at 323.
99. See, e.g., City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188,
200-01 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509-10 (1965) (Black, J.,
dissenting), with id. at 499-500 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment); see also Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
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interest" will be subject to substantive due process limitations. 101
Whether one agrees with the broader or the more narrow
construction of the substantive component of the Due Process
Clause's limitations on arbitrary governmental action, in those
instances where the limitations are applied, courts have expressed
common underlying concerns. Specifically, limits on arbitrary
governmental action in the substantive due process context exist to
ensure that there is a rational relationship between the government's
ends and its means. This requirement of rationality ensures that
government does not create arbitrary laws and protects against
arbitrary, unfair and oppressive governmental conduct. Within the
substantive due process context, these arbitrariness limitations
ensure a rational and fair system of governance.
b. The Vagueness Doctrine
Vagueness doctrine requires laws to be clear, specific and legally
fixed. The clarity requirement mandates that laws provide people of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what
conduct is prohibited.102 It is rooted in concepts of predictability and
fairness that allow individuals to conform their behavior to a known
set of rules. Vagueness doctrine also requires that laws be specific
enough to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.103 This
specificity mandate is predicated upon notions of equality and
fairness since, without standards in place, enforcement officials must

101. City of Cuyahoga Falls, 538 U.S. at 200-01 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia states:
It would be absurd to think that all 'arbitrary and capricious' governmental
action violates substantive due process-even, for example, the arbitrary and
capricious cancellation of a public employee's parking privileges. The
judicially created substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects,
we have said, certain 'fundamental liberty interests' from deprivation by the
government, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling state interest. (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
721 (1997)). Freedom from delay in receiving a building permit is not among
these 'fundamental liberty interests.' To the contrary, the Takings Clause
allows government confiscationof private property so long as it is taken for a
public use and just compensation is paid; mere regulation of land use need
not be 'narrowly tailored' to effectuate a compelling state interest.' Those
who claim 'arbitrary' deprivations of nonfundamental liberty interests must
look to the Equal Protection Clause, and Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386,
395, (1989) (parallel citation omitted), precludes the use of 'substantive due
process' analysis when a more specific constitutional provision governs.
Id.
102. Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966) ("It is established that a law
fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and
standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits ....
103. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
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utilize subjective notions of what is proscribed or permissible
conduct.104 Finally, the requirement that government officials be
guided by legally fixed standards105 ensures reviewability of
governmental action.
The vagueness doctrine developed during the early twentieth
century while courts addressed the growth of the administrative
state in the context of economic regulation.106 The early judicial
emphasis on economic regulation shifted with emerging legislative
periods. Currently, the degree of vagueness permitted within a
regulation varies depending upon the nature of the enactment at
issue, the nature of the governmental interest, the feasibility of more
precision, and whether uncertainty affects the fact of actual liability
or simply the grade of liability.107 In Village of Hoffman Estates, the
Supreme Court identified specific areas in which vagueness

104. Id.
105. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (reasoning that a law fails to
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless
that the public is uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or judges and jurors are free
to decide cases without any legally fixed standards). See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964) (invalidating a statute requiring teachers and state employees to take
loyalty oaths as a condition of employment); Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 400-02 (invalidating
statute permitting a jury to impose court costs upon a defendant who was tried and
found not guilty of a misdemeanor).
106. See, e.g., Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm'n of Okla., 286 U.S. 210, 242-43
(1932) (modifying an Oklahoma regulatory scheme dealing with extraction of natural
resources); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 564-65 (1931) (dealing with a statute
regulating public transport companies); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465-66
(1927) (enjoining enforcement of a Colorado anti-trust law as unconstitutionally
vague); Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 388, 395 (1926) (striking down a
minimum wage law as void-for-vagueness where the law required "not less than the
current rate.., per diem" to be paid); A. B. Small Co. v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S.
233, 238-39 (1925) (finding that an act governing the sale of sugar was
unconstitutionally vague because it was so indefinite that no one could ascertain the
prohibited activity); United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89-91 (1921)
(invalidating an anti-trust act as unconstitutionally vague), and companion cases; Am.
Seeding Mach. Co. v. Kentucky, 236 U.S. 660, 661-62 (1915) (voiding a conviction
under a state anti-trust law where it was uncertain as to what a price would have been
in the absence of the trust); Malone v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 639, 639 (1914) (voiding a
conviction under an anti-trust law on the grounds the law was unconstitutionally
vague); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 637-38 (1914) (voiding a conviction under
anti-trust law because it was unconstitutionally vague); Int'l Harvester Co. of Am. v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 223-24 (1914) (voiding a conviction on the grounds that the
statute was unconstitutionally vague).
107. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and The Construction of Penal
Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 196 (1985) (explaining that determining what is
permissible as compared to impermissible indeterminacy is a difficult issue). As
Justice Frankfurter said, "unconstitutional indefiniteness 'is itself an indefinite
concept."' Id. (citing Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 524 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting)).
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standards can vary - economic regulation, civil and criminal
penalties, and constitutionally protected rights.108 When a regulation
is economic, the law simply requires fair warning of what is
proscribed conduct.109 Enactments involving civil penalties are
provided somewhat less leeway than economic regulations but more
leeway than criminal penalties where the most stringent vagueness
test is applied.110
While most courts and scholars agree that the prohibition
against vagueness stems from the Due Process Clause,"'1 some
scholars have argued that the development of the vagueness doctrine
in federal law has non-constitutional roots in the common law.112
This claim arises from early findings by some courts that the
common law mandated that statutes too uncertain to be applied
would not be enforced.113 Other courts have likewise found
protections against arbitrary or vague laws in constitutional
provisions outside the Due Process Clause. For example, court
decisions from the turn of the twentieth century found constitutional
prohibitions against vagueness arising out of the separation of
108. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 49899 (1982) (explaining that for cases involving economic regulation the law simply
requires fair warning of what is proscribed. In the context of civil and criminal
penalties, the court finds that more exacting standards are required given the greater
consequences that accompany imprecision. Finally, in the area of constitutionally
protected rights, such as freedom of speech, the court applies a more stringent
vagueness test).
109. Id. at 498.
110. Id. at 498-99.
111. See Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998) ("Under
the First and Fifth Amendments, speakers are protected from arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement of vague standards.") (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 432-433 (1963)); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (holding
that a statute authorizing the imposition of the costs of prosecution on a defendant
acquitted of a misdemeanor charge violates due process because of vagueness and
absence of any standards sufficient to enable defendants to protect themselves against
arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of costs). In the First Amendment context,
the protections against vague statutes emanate from the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. See infra notes 221-28 and accompanying text.
112. Ralph W. Aigler, Legislation in Vague or General Terms, 21 MICH. L. REV. 831,
831 (1923).
113. See id.; Note, Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, 23
IND. L.J. 272, 283 (1948). Some early cases that found vagueness problems with
general criminal laws did not refer to any particular constitutional provision in their
analysis. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948) (holding that where
Congress had not attached a defined penalty to a criminal law, the Supreme Court
would not do so either); United States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278, 288 (1891) (dismissing
an indictment as invalid where the underlying statute failed to plainly and
unmistakably describe the prohibited conduct); Tozer v. United States, 52 F. 917
(C.C.E.D. Mo. 1892) (invalidating a portion of the Interstate Commerce Act as
indefinite and uncertain).
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powers doctrine,114 as well as the Sixth Amendment.115 Some scholars
note that the second prong of the vagueness standard, namely fair
enforcement, functions as a de facto equal protection guarantee.116
Other scholars, however, note that the use of the vagueness doctrine
to prohibit arbitrary enforcement of laws is misplaced since both
vague and specific laws alike are subject to improper enforcement.117
No matter its source or the varying standard applied, judicial
concerns about arbitrariness still exist. Under modern vagueness
jurisprudence, these judicial concerns arise in several contexts and
impose various limitations. Overall, the doctrine promotes specific
rules in order to create a predictable system in which individuals can
conform their behavior, enforcement officials can equally and fairly
apply the laws, and courts can effectively review governmental
action.11s
c. Punitive Damages
Though recognized only recently,119 constitutional limitations on
114. See, e.g., James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127 (1903); United States v. Reese, 92
U.S. 214, 221-22 (1876).
115. Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926); United States v. L. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) (reasoning that a vague law denied the accused the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation).
116. See, e.g., Kim Strosnider, Anti-Gang Ordinances after City of Chicago v.
Morales: The Intersection of Race, Vagueness Doctrine, and Equal Protection in the
Criminal Law, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 101, 101 (2002) (arguing that the second prong of
the vagueness standard functions as a de facto equal protection guarantee); Jeffries,
supra note 107, at 236 (arguing that the vagueness doctrine serves some equal
protection purpose).
117. See, e.g., Stuart Buck & Mark L. Rienzi, Federal Courts, Overbreadth, and
Vagueness: Guiding Principles for Constitutional Challenges to Uninterpreted State
Statutes, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 381, 389 n. 32 ("While arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement is certainly undesireable, it is not at all a harm unique to vague laws.").
118. In utilizing the vagueness doctrine to police arbitrary and selective
enforcement of the laws, the doctrine can be said to promote rule-of-law values. See,
e.g., Mark L. Amsterdam, Federal ConstitutionalRestrictions on the Punishment of
Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Displeasing Police
Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205, 221-24 (1967) (dealing with the problem of
discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement); Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (1956) (describing administration of the
vagrancy law in Philadelphia); Jeffries, supra note 107, at 215 (citing Papachristouv.
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972), for the notion that the standardless
vagrancy law permits and encourages an arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of
the law, Jeffries notes that the vagueness doctrine reinforces the rule of law);
Strosnider, supra note 116, at 116-18.
119. In fact, in 1989, the United States Supreme Court held that neither the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment nor federal common law
circumscribed awards of punitive damages in civil cases between private parties.
Browing-Ferris Indus. of Vt. Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 276-77 (1989)
(determining that the claim of excessiveness under the Due Process Clause of the
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the award of punitive damages also emanate from the Due Process
Clause.120 The Court found that when a punitive damage award is
grossly excessive, "it furthers no legitimate purpose and constitutes
an arbitrary deprivation of property."121 Typically, punitive damages
further the legitimate interest of "punishing unlawful conduct and
deterring its repetition."122 However, once the award is grossly
excessive it is considered arbitrary and a violation of due process.123

Fourteenth Amendment had not been raised in either the District Court or the Court
of Appeals and therefore was not considered by the Court). In 1991, the United States
Supreme Court first suggested that due process could guard against unreasonable
punitive damages in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
Despite this suggestion, the Court in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance upheld the
punitive damage award that exceeded four times the amount of compensatory
damages. Id. And, two years later the Court upheld as constitutional a punitive
damage award which was five hundred and twenty-six times greater than the actual
damages awarded by the jury. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443
(1993). It was not until 1996 that the Supreme Court first invalidated a punitive
damage award on constitutional grounds. BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559
(1996). Again, as recently as this term, the Court affirmed the factors set forth in
BMW and invalidated another punitive damage award as a violation of due process in
State Farm Mutual Automobile InsuranceCo. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
120. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416 ('The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on
a tortfeasor."). While due process is the most successful current constitutional
limitation, parties who have suffered large punitive damage awards have numerous
other constitutional challenges. For a discussion of various constitutional challenges
to punitive damages, see Michael J. Pepek, Case Note, TXO v. Alliance: Due Process
Limits and Introducing a Defendant's Wealth When Determining Punitive Damages
Awards, 25 PAC. L.J. 1191, 1200 n.64 (1994) (describing various constitutional
challenges based on the First Amendment, Confrontation, Self Incrimination, Double
Jeopardy, Excessive Fines and Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clauses). See also
Janice Kemp, The Continuing Appeal of Punitive Damages: An Analysis of
Constitutionaland Other Challenges to Punitive Damages Post-Haslip and Moriel, 26
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 46-58 (1995) (discussing a variety of constitutional challenges to
punitive damages including due process, Eighth Amendment excessive fines provision,
equal protection, First Amendment, supremacy clause, double jeopardy, separation of
powers, commerce clause and impairment of contracts).
121. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417 (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)) ("Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed
wisely and with restraint, they have the potential to advance legitimate state
interests. Imposed indiscriminately, however, they have a devastating potential for
harm. Regrettably, common-law procedures for awarding punitive damages fall into
the latter category.")).
122. BMW, 517 U.S. at 568.
123. Id.; see also Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
433 (2001) ("Despite the broad discretion that States possess with respect to the
imposition of criminal penalties and punitive damages, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitutional imposes substantive limits on
that discretion."); Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417-18 (finding that grossly excessive or
arbitrary punishments are prohibited by due process).
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At the root of an analysis of punitive damage awards24 are
concerns
about
arbitrariness,
fairness
and predictability.
Constitutional limitations promote predictability by requiring notice
of the prohibited conduct as well as the severity of the potential
punishment.125 Constitutional limitations also constrain inconsistent
sanctions and limit indiscriminate decision-making by juries.126
Unlike criminal penalties where defendants are afforded a host of
protections, civil punitive damage penalties lack significant
protections.127 Without some protections, juries that have wide
discretion and are susceptible to bias might indiscriminately award
punitive damages.125
At the crux of the limitations on punitive damages is the
constitutional requisite of avoiding awards that are so grossly
excessive as to be either per se arbitrary or amount to an arbitrary
deprivation of property. The underlying concern is that without a
constitutional floor, individuals will be unable to conform their
behavior and jury awards will be irrationally excessive and
inconsistent. In order to accomplish this result, courts attempt to
monitor the most irrational, arbitrary and inconsistent results and

124. The due process limits recognized in these cases are both procedural and
substantive. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 416 ("While states possess discretion over the
imposition of punitive damages, it is well established that there are procedural and
substantive constitutional limitations on these awards."). However, it is often difficult
to discern which due process protection the court is applying. See Campbell, 538 U.S.
at 437-38 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that, despite the majority's lack of
clarity, substantive due process was the basis of the decision).
125. See Campbell, 538 U.S. at 417 ("The reason is that 'elementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive
fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the
severity of the penalty that a State may impose."'); see also BMW, 517 U.S. at 587
(Breyer, J., concurring) ("This constitutional concern, itself harkening back to the
Magna Charta, arises out of the basic unfairness of depriving citizens of life, liberty, or
property, through the application, not of law and legal processes, but of arbitrary
coercion.").
126. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 59 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[The Due Process
Clause does not permit a State to classify arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point
of due process of the law in general is to allow citizens to order their behavior. A State
can have no legitimate interest in deliberately making the law so arbitrary that
citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon bias or whim."). For an
empirical analysis of how juries award punitive damages with a conclusion that the
determinations are arbitrary, see CASS SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How
JURIES DECIDE (2003) (synthesizing numerous scholarly research articles which use
empirical investigation to explore the apparent irrationality of punitive damages,
Professor Sunstein and his colleagues determine that juries make the kind of commonsense judgments most of us would make in similar circumstances, and these commonsense judgments result in awards that are arbitrary and in some respects perverse).
127. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 418.
128. Id.
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thereby promote the system's fairness and predictability.
d. Choice of Law
Since the mid-1930s courts have expressly acknowledged that
constitutional principles may permit application of the law of more
than one state.129 To resolve potential conflicts, courts analyze the
contacts of the state whose law is being applied to the parties and
transaction or occurrence that gives rise to the litigation.130 If no
significant contact or aggregation of contacts exist between the state
and the parties or subject giving rise to the litigation, then the
application of that state's law is unconstitutional.131 Without these
significant contacts between the state and the parties or subject of
the litigation, courts reason, there is not a sufficient state interest to
permit its law to resolve the dispute and application of the state's
laws would be arbitrary or unfair.132 Once the constitutional question
is resolved, the rules for choosing between the conflicting state laws
are determined by state law.133
The doctrine of choice of laws emanates from the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment134 and the Full Faith and
Credit Clause.135 Under current jurisprudence, courts do not
129. See Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 544-50
(1935); see also Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954).
130. The analysis is often referred to as two-pronged, which includes both federal
constitutional and state law components. This two-pronged analysis can cause some
terminological problems. One commentator has distinguished the two prongs by
reference to legislative jurisdiction and adjudicative jurisdiction. Under this analysis,
when application of a particular state's law in a multi-state case meets federal
constitutional requirements, that state has legislative jurisdiction. Assuming that two
or more states have legislative jurisdiction, the term choice of law can be utilized for
the purely state-law problem of resolving conflicts between the local laws of these
states. See Terry S. Kogan, Toward A JurisprudenceOf Choice Of Law: The Priority
Of Fairness Over Comity, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1987). Adjudicative jurisdiction (or
judicial jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction or territorial jurisdiction) refers to the
power of a state to try a case in its courts. See Harold Korn, The Choice-of-Law
Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772, 781-86, 807 (1983) (describing
relationship between state law inquiry and constitutional inquiry); Willis L.M. Reese,
Legislative Jurisdiction,78 COLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1587 (1978).
131. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
132. Id. In practice however, courts have only infrequently invalidated a law on
constitutional choice of law grounds. Kogan, supra note 130, at 654. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 427 U.S. 797 (1985), was the first case in thirty-eight years in
which "the Court struck down a state court's choice-of-law decision." Kogan, supra
note 130, at 654.
133. See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308; Alaska Packers Ass'n, 294 U.S. at 542.
134. Kogan, supra note 130, at 653-54. The Amendment reads, "[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
135. Kogan, supra note 130, at 653-54. The Article reads, "Full Faith and Credit
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emphasize the independent impact each of these doctrines has on a
choice of law question36 but instead rely upon the application of both
doctrines together, implying that they are perhaps indistinguishable
for purposes of choice of law analysis.a7
There are two broad concerns underlying choice of law doctrine:
comity and fairness.i3s While courts address issues of comity by
attempting to account for the competing policy choices of states
within a federal system, the fairness concern emanates from concepts
of non-arbitrariness. Specifically, courts analyze the contacts that
exist between the parties and the transaction or occurrence that
gives rise to the litigation to ensure that the law being applied is not
arbitrary or unfair.139 By ensuring that there is no arbitrary

shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
very other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1
136. See Kogan, supra note 130, at 654 (explaining that the courts are not clear on
how each of these independently impact the analysis in the choice of law context).
137. See id. at 654 (citing Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308 n.10 (Brennan, J., plurality)).
Many scholars and commentators have resigned themselves to the rather
indistinguishable nature of the due process and full faith and credit clauses in the
choice of law question, and have simply acknowledged that the two clauses together
are utilized to address the concerns raised by choice of law questions. See id. at 654
n.il.
138. Russel J. Weintraub's Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Limitations on a
State's Choice of Law was one of the earliest articulations of the two concerns as 'goals'
in designing choice-of-law rules. 44 IOWA L. REV. 449, 449-50 (1959). See also
McCluney v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578, 582 (8th Cir. 1981)
(characterizing as traditional concerns "preventing unfairness to the parties and
promoting healthier interstate relations"), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 1071 (1981); LEA
BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM
274 (The Michie Co. 1986) (identifying "fairness to the protesting litigant and the
interests (or lack of interests) of the forum"); EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY,
CONFLICT OF LAws § 3.26, at 95 (West Publ'g Co. 1982) (discussing "the extent of the
court's territorial power and the fairness of the exercise of that power"); James Martin,
Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH. L. REV. 872, 879-83 (1980)
(discussing fairness and interstate relations); Reese, supra note 130, at 1594-607
(identifying "fairness" and "interstate and international values" as the considerations);
Willis L.M. Reese, The Hague Case: An Opportunity Lost, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 195
(1981) [hereinafter Reese, Hague] ("[A]ll members of the Court agreed that there are
constitutional limitations on choice of law and that two values are involved in
determining the scope of these limitations. One of the values is fairness to the
").
litigants, and the other is concerned with the needs of the federal system ....
139. Allstate, 449 U.S. at 308 ('In order to ensure that the choice of law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair, the Court has invalidated the choice of law of a
State which has had no significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, with the parties and the occurrence or transaction.") (citation
omitted); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818-19 (1985) ("[Flor a state's
substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that state
must have a significant contact or aggregation of contacts, creating state interests,
such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."). See also
Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. Pinellas County, 221
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application of state law to a particular conflict, the choice of law
doctrine creates a fair and predictable system. In this way, choice of
law doctrine promotes predictability by upholding the parties'
expectations regarding application of state law. Additionally, the
application of state law is governed by a rational relation between
the state law and the parties to the conflict. In the absence of
connection to a particular state, no fair way would exist to determine
which state's laws apply to a particular conflict. Thus, limitations in
the choice of law context are focused on creating a system that leads
to predictability and fairness.
2. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The nondelegation doctrine, which provides limits on Congress's
ability to allocate its legislative powers to other branches of
government, emanates from Article I of the U.S. Constitution140 and
serves separation of power principles.141 One of the basic purposes of
the doctrine is to prevent arbitrary decision-making by unelected and
unresponsive administrative agents of government.42 As such, the
F.3d 1211, 1216 (11th Cir. 2000); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 47 F. Supp.2d 330, 335
(E.D.N.Y. 1999); Diehl v. Ogorewac, 836 F. Supp. 88, 92 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Wert v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 634 F. Supp 401, 404-05 (E.D. Mo. 1986).
140. J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control
Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1514 n.211 (2003) ("The nondelegation
doctrine, which is derived from Article I, Section 7 and the Due Process Clause, forbids
Congress from delegating legislative decisions to agencies."); Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Schechter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative
State, 109 YALE L. J. 1399, 1416-17 (2000) ("The Court traditionally has understood
the nondelegation doctrine to flow primarily from Article I or the separation-of-powers
principle."). But there are some scholars who argue that the nondelegation doctrine
also derives from the Due Process Clause. See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers
and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1553 (1991) (connecting the
nondelegation doctrine to due process); Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to
Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 733 (1969) (noting that the doctrine may become a
facet of due process, or may in the long term shift from a constitutional to a commonlaw base).
141. The Federalists papers recognized that separation of powers was designed to
police arbitrary action. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 337 (James Madison) ('Were the
power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
exposed to arbitrary control .. ") (quoting Montesquieu). See also Bressman, supra
note 140, at 1406-08 (suggesting that broad delegation reinforces democracy because it
promotes accountability and public participation); Cynthia Farina, Statutory
Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 452, 479 n.105 (1989) (identifying that the Supreme Court and commentators
attribute the nondelegation doctrine to separation of powers).
142. Darren Summerville, Note, The Nondelegation Doctrine After Whitman v.
American Trucking Assoc.: Constitutional Precedent Breathes a Sigh of Relief, 18 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 627, 636 (2001) ("Like the admittedly lofty goals elucidated in classic
nondelegation decisions, the new mode of delegation analysis had a baseline
assumption that arbitrary decisionmaking by unelected and unresponsive government
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limitations created by the nondelegation doctrine are designed to
ensure that unelected administrative agents cannot take action
without properly promulgated standards.143 In the absence of such
limitations, the potential for arbitrary decision-making by
unaccountable officials is impermissibly heightened.144
Underlying the nondelegation limitations are concerns about
accountability, reviewability, predictability and equality. The
doctrine promotes accountability by ensuring that laws are made by
the legislative branch of government145 and by prohibiting
delegations of legislative authority to another branch of
government.4 6 However, recognizing that government cannot
function without some delegation, courts permit delegation where it
is accompanied and governed by "intelligible principles."147 This
doctrinal limitation promotes accountability and transparency by
requiring that only those subject to political ramifications make laws,
14
thus, allowing the public a political response. 8
Nondelegation constraints also encourage reviewability by
requiring that the legislative branch provide "intelligible principles"
members should be avoided.").
143. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993) (noting that the
administrative bureaucracy presents a potential for arbitrariness: it is a
decisionmaker without accountability).
144. Id.
145. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part);
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
146. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) ('The
Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative
functions with which it is thus vested."); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
421 (1935) ('The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to
others, the essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested.").
147. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 409 (1928) ("In
determining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the
extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and
So long as Congress
the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination ....
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative
action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."). Once an administrative
standard is properly promulgated, it is functionally no different than if Congress had
legislated the standard. Bressman, supra note 140, at 1416 ("[A]dministrative limiting
standards, once promulgated, function no differently than if Congress had written
them into the original statute-that is, they bind agencies in implementing the
statutory provision to which they apply. In this way, the standards serve to limit
administrative discretion and prevent arbitrary administrative decisionmaking.");
Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932)
(finding that agencies must follow their own rules until they are properly changed).
148. Mark Seidenfeld & Jim Rossi, The False Promise of the "New" Nondelegation
Doctrine, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 (2000) (noting that in promoting accountability,
the nondelegation doctrine also serves rule of law values).
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against which courts are able to review agency action.149 This
nondelegation constraint minimizes arbitrary decision-making by
agencies and enhances the likelihood of meaningful judicial review.150
Concerns of predictability and equality are addressed by the
limitations created by the nondelegation doctrine51 and serve to
further "rule-of-law" values which limit arbitrary decision-making by
administrative officials.152 As Professor Jerry Mashaw has stated:
A consistent strain of our constitutional politics asserts that
legitimacy flows from 'the rule of law.' By that is meant a
system of objective and accessible commands, law which can be
seen to flow from collective agreement rather than from the
exercise of discretion or preference by those persons who
happen to be in positions of authority. By reducing discretion,
and thereby the possibility for the exercise of the individual
preferences of officials, specific rules reinforce the rule of law.153
These "rule-of-law" values reduce uncertainty154 and encourage
predictability by making the laws known to the public so individuals
149. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 626 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part); Am.
Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U.S. 385, 389 (1945).
150. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam);
Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 148, at 4 ("In his opinion, Judge Williams notes that
such ex ante constraints are normatively desirable because they minimize arbitrary
decisionmaking by the agency, enhance the likelihood of meaningful judicial review,
and help to assure that government is responsive to the popular will.").
151. See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,98 MICH. L. REV.
303, 337 (1999) ("The nondelegation doctrine.., promotes rule-of-law values."); id. at
350 ("While constrained administrative discretion [under the new nondelegation
doctrine] does not mean congressional lawmaking, it does tend to promote
predictability, consistency, and visibility in law, and to ensure against ad hoc
discretion by administrators, discretion that might be exercised arbitrarily."). See also
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 448 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item Veto
Act as a violation of the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment); Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (holding that there is
no rule preventing Congress from delegating authority to define criminal conduct, so
long as Congress recognizes the conduct as a criminal offense); Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (finding that so long as Congress sets out an
intelligible principle to direct the conduct of a delegated authority, such delegation is
not a forbidden legislative action).
152. The "new delegation doctrine" also promotes rule of law values which are
designed in part to prevent arbitrary decision-making by administrative officials. See
Bressman, supra note 140, 1424-27 (2000) (arguing that the "new delegation doctrine"
promotes rule of law values); Sunstein, supra note 151, at 337 (stating that, "[tihe
nondelegation doctrine also promotes rule-of-law values").
153. JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 138-39 (1997).
154. Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 148, at 5 n.19 ("If it were not possible to
communicate general standards of conduct, which multitudes of individuals could
understand, without further direction, as requiring from them certain conduct when
occasion arose, nothing that we now recognize as law could exist.") (citing H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121 (1961)).
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can plan their conduct accordingly.155 Nondelegation limitations, and
"rule-of-law values," also promote concepts of consistency by ensuring
equal application of the law to similarly situated individuals as
opposed to arbitrary treatment of the disfavored minority.156 These
equitable considerations are served by cabining discretionary
governmental authority and reducing arbitrary or capricious
decision-making.157 Thus, limitations on delegation and "rule-of-law"
values promote predictability and equality which, in turn, protects
against the arbitrary discretion of administrators. 158
While nondelegation principles were articulated by the Court as
early as 1825,159 the use of the doctrine to invalidate governmental
action has been very limited.160 It was not until 1935 that the
Supreme Court, in two cases, invalidated congressional delegations
on the grounds that the delegations were too broad and provided no
standards to guide the executive officials implementing the
statutes.161 Since that time, the Supreme Court has upheld all broad
delegations that have been challenged under the nondelegation
doctrine. 162

155. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 337 (finding that the nondelegation doctrine
promotes rule-of-law values "by promoting planning by ordinary people subject to law,
by giving them a sense of what is permitted and what is forbidden").
156. Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 148, at 5.
157. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 337.
158. See id. at 337, 350.
159. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825) (finding that Congress
must be permitted to delegate to others at least some authority it could exercise itself);
Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (setting forth the
"intelligible principal" standard and upholding delegation to the Executive Branch to
revise tariff duties).
160. See DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 140, at 1459 n.53 (setting out the history
of the nondelegation doctrine); David Schoenbrod, The Delegation Doctrine: Could the
Court Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985) (explaining the historical
challenges to the nondelegation doctrine).
161. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310-12 (1936) (invalidating parts of
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power to large coal producers); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (invalidating the National Industrial Recovery Act provision
that allowed trade association and industry groups to establish codes of fair
competition as an unconstitutional delegation of power); Panama Refining Co v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (invalidating a provision of the National Industrial Recovery
Act relating to the interstate shipment of oil because Congress provided no policy,
standards, or rules to guide the President's discretion in issuing regulations under the
statute).
162. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001)
(upholding a provision of the Clean Air Act requiring the EPA to promulgate ambient
air quality standards); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 785-86 (1948)
(upholding delegation of authority to determine excessive profits); Am. Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946) (upholding delegation to the SEC to prevent unfair
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Given the doctrinal development of the nondelegation doctrine
and ongoing concerns about arbitrary governmental action, scholars
have debated the doctrine's usefulness and offered varying proposals
for reform.163 As early as 1969, concerns were raised about arbitrary
governmental action and the shortcomings of the nondelegation
doctrine in addressing these concerns.164 Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis argued that the nondelegation doctrine failed to prevent the

distribution of voting power); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944)
(upholding delegation involving commodity prices under the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942); Fed. Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 660 (1944)
(upholding delegation to Federal Power Commission to determine just and reasonable
rates); Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (upholding
delegation to Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate broadcast
licensing). There have however been recent decisions in which the congressional
delegations of authority have been invalidated on grounds other than nondelegation.
See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (invalidating the FCC
interpretation of a statutory provision as unreasonable under the Chevron test);
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (invalidating the Line Item Veto Act
as a violation of the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment);
Metro. Wash. Airports Auth, v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S.
252 (1991) (finding that Congress's conditioning the transfer of the District of
Columbia area airports to the local airport authority upon the creation of a review
board with control over decisions violated separation of powers); Bowsher v. Synar,
478 U.S. 714 (1986) (finding that Congressional grant of various executive powers to
the Comptroller General, an officer removable by Congress, violated separation of
powers); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (finding a plan allowing one house of
Congress to veto a determination made by the INS unconstitutional because it violated
procedures for lawmaking under Article I); see also Sunstein, supra note 151, at 330-35
(summarizing the historical development of the nondelegation doctrine).
163. For a summary of various scholarly writings on the nondelegation doctrine, see
R. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 140, 1514 n.211. There is vast delegation
literature in the law. See, e.g., JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 131-34 (1970)
(arguing for a revival of the doctrine); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make PoliticalDecisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985); Davis,
supra note 140, at 713-15 (arguing that the nondelegation doctrine as originally
formulated was insufficient and proposing that administrators themselves confine
discretion through the use of standards, principles and rules); Sunstein, supra note
151, at 357-59 (arguing that in the modern administrative state, issues of regulation
are not best resolved by the nondelegation doctrine but instead through the use of a
set of "nondelegation canons" that prevent agencies from acting without clear
congressional authority). For a description of two recent opposing views on the
relationships between democracy and delegation, see Bressman, supra note 140, at
1406-08. The first view, articulated by David Schoenbrod, claims that delegation
violates principles of democratic governance by allowing lawmaking by unaccountable
bureaucrats. Id. at 1406. The second view, represented by Jerry Mashaw and Peter
Schuck, claims that delegation reinforces democracy. Id. at 1407-08. Mashaw argues
this is so because agency lawmaking is subject to Presidential control and the
President is more responsive to the public. Id. Schuck argues that agency decisionmaking is more responsive to the public because agencies are accessible to the people
and their input at that level is less costly. Id.
164. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 140.
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uncontrolled use of discretionary governmental power 165 and
proposed that the doctrine be altered to protect against arbitrary
administrative power by shifting the focus on statutory standards to
the creation of administrative safeguards and standards.166 He
proposed that this shift include the judicially enforced requirement
that administrators structure and confine their administrative power
through the creation and application of standards, principles and
rules.167 According to Professor Davis, courts should permit
administrative agencies to provide their own standards.168 Davis'
approach briefly appeared to take hold in a series of cases finding
that the Due Process Clause requires agencies to supply standards to
govern their discretion.169
Professor Cass Sunstein argues that there exist far better ways
to resolve issues of regulation than through the nondelegation
doctrine.170 In particular, he argues that the proper role of the
doctrine is "in statutory construction that imposes floors and ceilings
on agency action, and in a set of 'nondelegation canons' that prevent
agencies from acting without clear congressional authorization."171
While he acknowledges that the nondelegation doctrine should be
used in the most extreme cases to invalidate open-ended grants of
authority to administrative agencies,172 he advocates that the more
effective solution is to utilize the nondelegation canons that he
proposes to prevent agencies from acting without congressional
authority. 173
Another scholar, Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman argues the
existence of a new delegation doctrine that "requires administrative

165. Id. at 719-22.
166. Id. at 725-30 (offering five proposals to alter the doctrine and make it more
effective: change the purpose of the doctrine to protect private parties against injustice
on account of unnecessary discretionary power; shift from focus on legislative
standards to safeguards; if the legislative standards are inadequate then courts should
require the administrative agencies to supply the standards; should expand to the
creation of safeguards, standards, principles and rules; and should also protect against
selective enforcement).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 728-29
169. See generally Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1982); Jensen v. Adm'r
of the FAA, 641 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1981); Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1978);
White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); Burke v. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
D.E.A., 968 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Martinez v. Ibarra, 759 F. Supp 664 (D.
Colo. 1991); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D. N.H. 1976).
170. See generally Sunstein, supra note 151.
171. Id. at 305 (noting the "unmistakable signs of revival" of the nondelegation
doctrine).
172. Id. at 356.
173. Id. at 305-07.
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agencies to issue rules containing reasonable limits on their
discretion in exchange for broad grants of regulatory authority."174
She contends that this new doctrine is a more effective way to
regulate arbitrary governmental action for a number of reasons
including lower transaction costs.175 Bressman's conception of the
delegation doctrine would permit the transfer of lawmaking
authority to administrative agencies as long as binding
administrative standards exist to restrain agency authority. 176
In sum, the nondelegation doctrine, in its original and proposed
new forms, has as a central purpose to limit arbitrary administrative
decision-making. Underlying the doctrine's limitations are concerns
about accountability, reviewability, predictability and equality which
are addressed by placing limitations on delegations of discretion to
agencies, either via "intelligible principles" or through the
requirement of agency rules.
3. The Equal Protection Clause
The essence of equal protection doctrine is to encourage that
similarly situated individuals not be treated differently.177 Thus,
when the government creates distinctions that are based on arbitrary
or irrational purposes, the distinctions offend basic notions of equal
protection.178 Contemporary equal protection analysis emerges from
the concept of arbitrariness first articulated in Yick Wo v. Hopkins179
in which the Court stated:
When we consider the nature and the theory of our institutions
of government. . . they do not mean to leave room for the play
and action of purely personal and arbitrary power ....[Tihe
very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the
means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails ....180

174. Bressman, supranote 140, at 1415.
175. Id. at 1419-22.
176. Id. at 1415.
177. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) ("The purpose of the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person...
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.") (citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v.
Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
178. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 681 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the "Equal Protection Clause prevents States from arbitrarily
treating people differently under their laws.").
179. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). See also J. Michael McGuinness, The Rising Tide of
Equal Protection: Willowbrook and the New Non-Arbitrariness Standard, 11 GEo
MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 263, 264 (2001) (stating that "[c]ontemporary equal protection
cases evolved from Yick Wo's foundation of non-arbitrariness.").
180. Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 369-70.
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Underlying the doctrine are judicial concerns about rationality,
equality and fairness. Issues of arbitrary governmental action arise
most frequently within the framework of rational basis review, where
courts require, at a minimum, that legislative classifications be
rationally, not arbitrarily, related to a legitimate government
interest and not the product of bias, fear or animus.181 This
requirement of a rational, non-arbitrary, relationship between the
government's means and its ends also addresses concerns of fairness
and equity by requiring that there exists a permissible non-arbitrary
reason for treating similarly situated people differently.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires, at a minimum, that a government classification be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest.182 In addition,
courts employ a heightened level of scrutiny based upon the
historical treatment of certain groups as well as concerns that
specific classifications, such as race or gender, typically do not
present sound bases for differential treatment.1s3 For example, if a
fundamental right or suspect class is at issue, courts employ a strict
level of scrutinylS4 under which the classification must be necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest.185 If gender or

181. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440-42 (1985).
182. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-33 (1996); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 319-20 (1993); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988)
("[Arbitrary and irrational discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause under
even our most deferential standard of review."); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297, 303 (1976); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973); Ciechon
v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 522 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Equal protection demands at a
minimum that [government] must apply its laws in a rational and nonarbitrary way.").
See also RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw-SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 14.7 (3d ed. 1999) (explaining that in the absence of
fundamental rights or suspect classifications that do not fit under the intermediate
level of scrutiny, courts employ rational basis review to determine if the classification
rationally related to a legitimate government interest).
183. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440-41 (explaining that classifications based on
race, alienage, or national origin are so rarely relevant to legitimate state interests
that such classifications should be reviewed under strict scrutiny and that
classifications based on gender and illegitimacy also rarely provide reason for
differential treatment such classifications are subject to intermediate scrutiny).
184. ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 182, § 14.7 (explaining that if a fundamental
right or suspect class is at issue, the Court employs strict scrutiny to determine if the
legislative classification is necessary to promote a compelling government interest).
185. City of Richmond v. J.A. Crosen Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989) (holding that
a city's plan that required prime contractors to subcontract thirty percent of the
amount of the contract to "minority business enterprises" did not have a sufficient
compelling governmental interest and was not narrowly tailored to remedy the harms
caused by past discrimination); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971)
(holding that aliens are a good example of a "discrete and insular minority"); Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969) (acknowledging the fundamental right to
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illegitimacy is at issue, courts employ an intermediate level of
scrutiny86 under which the classification must bear a substantial
relationship to an important governmental interest. 187
While the Equal Protection Clause has evolved over time,188 it
has been used in various contexts to regulate arbitrary action.189 For
example, the Court recently found that manual recounts ordered by
the Florida Supreme Court, without specific standards for
implementation, resulted in the "arbitrary and disparate" treatment
of voters and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause.190 In so
holding, the Court presupposed the impermissibility of the disparate

travel even without express textual authorization); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist.
No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (finding that the right to vote provides a foundation
for a representative democracy).
186. ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 182, § 14.7 (explaining that if gender or
illegitimacy is at issue, the Court employs intermediate scrutiny to determine if the
legislative classification bears a substantial relationship to an important
governmental interest).
187. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) (holding that statesupported women-only nursing school that denied enrollment to otherwise qualified
males violates the Equal Protection Clause); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204 (1976)
(holding that statistical evidence as to the drunk driving rates among males and
females aged eighteen to twenty-one provided insufficient support for gender-based
discrimination under an Oklahoma statute); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510, 516
(1976) (upholding denial of benefits to illegitimate children of deceased parents as
constitutional based on Congress's failure to presume illegitimate children as
dependents who did not live with a parent at the time of death).
188. See Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection
Jurisprudence:Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1210 ('The story of the equal protection doctrine's development is
well known, from the Fourteenth Amendment's tumultuous adoption during
Reconstruction, through its early ineffectiveness in Plessy v. Fergusonand its later rise
to prominence in the landmark decision Brown v. Board of Education, to the recent
controversy over use of its Fifth Amendment counterpart to strictly scrutinize
affirmative action in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena. Since equal protection's
forceful emergence in Brown, it has provided the primary constitutional tool to rectify
discrimination perpetrated or accommodated by government.") (footnotes omitted).
189. The examples used are not intended to be exhaustive, but instead, merely
illustrative of some areas in which the courts regulate arbitrary governmental action.
190. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (finding that the use of standardless
manual recounts violates the Equal Protection Clause through its recognition that the
Equal Protection Clause requires uniform rules and non-arbitrary treatment). For an
earlier example of a voting case in which the Supreme Court found an equal protection
violation where irregular weighting systems arbitrarily granted less voting influence
based on geographic location, see Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969). In Moore,
the Court found that the arbitrary formula utilized by the government raised equality
concerns by creating a system in which some votes were given more weight than
others. Id. For other examples in the voting context, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 565-66 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 709-10 (1964); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
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treatment of voters. 191 In concluding that without specific uniform
standards there could not be equal treatment of voters, 192 the Court
found that a fair and equal system would require: adoption of
statewide standards; procedures identified to implement the
standards; and the opportunity for judicial review of disputed
matters.193

The Supreme Court's contraception decisions raise similar
concerns about equality, fairness and rationality. For example, in
Eisenstadt v. Baird,194 the Court found that while states may, in
some instances, treat people differently, they cannot do so in a way
that is arbitrary.195 Specifically, the Court reasoned that there must
be a rational, non-arbitrary relation between the classification and
the purpose of the legislation.96 Thus, the Court examined the
government's two claimed purposes for the law and found that
neither proffered purpose was the true purpose. 197 In the absence of a
true legitimate purpose for treating individuals differently,198 the
Court found the legislation violated equal protection proscriptions.
The Court's analysis evidenced its concern that individuals receive
equal treatment as well as a desire to avoid arbitrary governmental
action. 199
Issues of arbitrariness in the equal protection context have also
arisen in zoning cases. 200 For example, in City of Cleburne v.

191. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105.
192. Id. at 106, 109 (expressing concern that not only different counties had
different standards, but that standards varied within the same county).
193.

Id. at 110.

194. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). While some scholars might view Eisenstadtas a disguised
heightened scrutiny case, the Court did address the classification in terms of
arbitrariness. Id. at 447.
195. Id. at 448-52 (analyzing a statute that distinguished between three classes:
married persons who were permitted to obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy,
but only from a doctor or by prescription; single persons who could not obtain
contraception to prevent a pregnancy from anyone; and married or single persons who
were permitted to obtain contraceptives to prevent the spread of disease).
196. Id. at 447.
197. Id. at 448 (examining the state's purported purposes to deter fornication for
health concerns).
198. Id. at 453 (determining that the unstated purpose of a general prohibition on
contraception was impermissible under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
199. Id. at 454 ("[N]othing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to
allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation
and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger
numbers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will be
just than to require that laws be equal in operation."') (quoting Ry. Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949)).
200. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 471 n.23
(1985) (holding that mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification calling for
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Cleburne Living Center, the Court reasoned that in the absence of
any rational basis offered for believing that a group home for the
"mentally retarded" would pose any special threat to the city's
legitimate interests, the governmental decision appeared to rest on
an irrational prejudice against "mentally retarded" people and was
simply arbitrary.201 Underlying the Court's analysis was the concern
that bias and fear was used as a basis to treat otherwise similarly
situated people differently.202 The Court rejected each of the city's
proposed legislative purposes as being based merely on irrational,
arbitrary prejudice and thus found a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.203
Likewise, in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, the Supreme Court
applied the rational basis standard of review and found the
government's actions violated the Equal Protection Clause because
they were arbitrary and irrational.204 When the plaintiffs sought to
have the municipal government connect their property to a water

a more exacting standard of judicial review than is normally accorded to economic and
social legislation, and that requiring a special use permit for proposed group home for
the mentally retarded, without a rational basis for doing so, violates the Equal
Protection Clause). See also Martin v. Shawano-Gresham Sch. Dist., 295 F.3d 701,
712-13 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding that even where there is no suspect class and no
fundamental right involved, an individual may state a "class of one" equal protection
claim if she has been "intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment") (citing Vill. of
Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)); Goshtasby v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.
141 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding that "discrimination on the basis of
of Ill.,
age is subject to rational-basis review.. . and 'arbitrary and irrational discrimination
violates the Equal Protection Clause under even our most deferential standard of
review") (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988)).
201. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 471 n.23.
202. Id. at 448.
203. Id. at 447-50 (identifying the city's purposes for the permit as: concerns with
the negative attitude of property owners and fear of the elderly; the location of the
home next to a school; the location of the home on a flood plain; the size of the home;
and the number of individuals who would reside in the home).
204. 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause can be
the basis of a claim for an individual even where the individual does not allege
membership in a class or group where the action of the government was "irrational
and wholly arbitrary") In allowing such claims, the Court explained that the purpose
of the Equal Protection Clause is to secure every person within the state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination whether occasioned by express terms
of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents. Id. See also
McFarland v. Am. Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1916) (finding that a statute
that "bristles with severities that touch the plaintiff alone" was arbitrary and a
violation of equal protection); Erwin Chemerinsky, Suing the Government for Arbitrary
Actions, 36 TRIAL 89 (May 2000) (noting that Olech provides that "equal protection
claims can be brought by those claiming to have been singled out for discriminatory
treatment even if they are a class of one and not a victim of discrimination based on
group characteristics").
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supply, the municipality conditioned its connection of the water upon
obtaining from plaintiffs a thirty-three foot easement. 205 Plaintiffs
thereafter alleged a violation of equal protection on the grounds that
all other residents were only required to provide a fifteen foot
easement. 206 In reaching its conclusion that the government's
conduct was impermissibly arbitrary, the Court found that there was
no rational basis for the difference in treatment and that such
arbitrary, and irrational, differential treatment violated the Equal
Protection Clause under even the most lenient standard of review.207
Also emanating from the Equal Protection Clause are
constitutional limitations upon the use of prosecutorial discretion.208
Despite the fact that prosecutors are generally granted a substantial
amount of discretion, courts are permitted to intervene in two
circumstances both of which involve concerns about arbitrariness.209
If a prosecutorial decision is not rationally related to a legitimate

205. Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 563.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 564-65.
208. In state cases, these include protections offered by the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as state constitutional
equal protection provisions. In federal cases these protections are afforded under the
equal protection provision within the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Mark
L. Amsterdam, The One-Sided Sword: Selective Prosecution in Federal Courts, 6
In federal cases, claims of discriminatory
RUTGERS-CAM. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1974).
enforcement have been based on the right to equal protection embraced within the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 5-6. The courts apparently make
no distinction on the basis of the clause relied on, and equal protection and due process
are in effect interchangeable for purposes of discriminatory enforcement cases. See id.
The constitutional protections against selective enforcement derive from the
protections afforded under the Equal Protection Clause. See United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (finding that under the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the decision to prosecute may
not be based on arbitrary classifications such as race or religion); Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (finding that "[i]t is appropriate to judge selective
prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection standards").
209. The limitations on arbitrary prosecutorial actions apply also to specific
prosecutorial decisions at trial. For example, a federal prosecutor's decision not to
deviate from the sentencing guidelines is subject to equal protection analysis so long
as the discretion is exercised with impermissible motive. See, e.g., Wade v. United
States, 504 U.S. 181, 183 (1992) (holding that district courts may review a prosecutor's
refusal to file a motion seeking reduction below statutory or guideline minimum
sentences for defendants providing substantial assistance in the investigation or
conviction of persons for other offenses, if the refusal was based on an unconstitutional
motive). Courts have also found an arbitrariness limitation in an Immigration and
Naturalization Service attorney's authority to initiate deportation proceedings. See,
e.g., Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1324 (9th Cir. 1988) (equating the INS attorney's
authority to initiate deportation proceedings to the decision to initiate prosecutorial
discretion); Cervantes v. Perryman, 954 F. Supp. 1257, 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
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governmental interest,210 or if it is based on improper or unjustified
traits such as race, gender or religion,211 then it is viewed as being
based on arbitrary standards and violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.212 Thus, courts will review a prosecutor's discretion in
instances where an individual can show that the law was not applied
to other similarly situated individuals and where selective
application was deliberately based upon an impermissible trait such
as race, religion or some other arbitrary classification.213
Judicial oversight of prosecutorial discretion was the basis of the
seminal Yick Wo decision, where a San Francisco ordinance was
being exclusively applied to those of Chinese ancestry. 214 In its
opinion, the Court expressed concerns that the lack of standards2ls
210. Wade, 504 U.S. at 182.
211. See, e.g., id. at 186; Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608; Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357, 364 (1978); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); Ex Parte Littlefield, 540
S.E.2d 81, 84 (S.C. 2000) ("Although prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not
unlimited. The judiciary is empowered to infringe on the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion when it is necessary to review and interpret the results of the prosecutor's
actions when those actions violate certain constitutional mandates. For example, the
judiciary may infringe on prosecutorial discretion where the prosecutor bases the
decision to prosecute on unjustifiable standards such as race, religion or other
arbitrary factors."); People v. Abram, 680 N.Y.S.2d 414, 417 (City Ct. 1998) (finding
that criminal defendants are entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment and interpreting this provision as forbidding public authority from
making illegal or improper distinctions between similarly situated persons).
212. Despite the ostensibly broad coverage of its protections, the equal protection
limitations on prosecutorial discretion is mired in confusion about its scope and
application. In particular, there exist disagreement concerning the appropriate
method of raising the claim, the quantum of proof required to prove a claim, and the
See Andrew B.
availability of discovery for the party claiming the violation.
Weissman, The Discriminatory Application of Penal Laws by State Judicial and
Quasi-JudicialOfficers: Playing the Shell Game of Rights and Remedies, 69 Nw. U. L.
REV. 489, 502 (1974). It is undisputed that the party claiming the discriminatory
enforcement has the burden of proof. Id. at 510; Amsterdam, supra note 208, at 19.
The injured party also bears the burden of persuasion. Joseph H. Tieger, Police
Discretion and DiscriminatoryEnforcement, 1971 DUKE L.J. 717, 738-39. However,
there exist no clear standards as to quantum of proof required or the type of proof that
is sufficient to substantiate a claim. See id. at 738-39; Amsterdam, supra note 208, at
15-17. Further, the very proof often needed by an individual to substantiate a claim is
often exclusively in the possession of the prosecutor and subject to limited discovery.
Amsterdam, supra note 208, at 19. Courts have severely restricted access to this
discovery by requiring individuals to present both a colorable showing of selectivity as
well as the use of improper standards. See Stefan H. Krieger, Comment, Defense
Access to Evidence of DiscriminatoryProsecution, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 648, 650, 660.
213. See Weissman, supra note 212, at 503 (explaining that mere selectivity in the
enforcement of the law, standing alone, does not constitute a denial of equal
protection, since prosecutorial authorities must necessarily exercise some discretion in
determining whom to prosecute).
214. 118 U.S. 356, 357-59 (1886).
215. Id. at 366-67, 372-73 (expressing concerns about partiality or oppression that
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subjected individuals to the mere will of the enforcement official,216
and that there was no rational, non-arbitrary, reason to treat those of
217
Chinese ancestry differently from those of non-Chinese ancestry.
One hundred years later, the Court similarly scrutinized the
government's "passive enforcement policy" of prosecuting for draft
violations only those who were reported by themselves or others.218
Though the Court ultimately found that the government had treated
similarly all reported non-registrants,219 it held that a decision to
prosecute "cannot be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable
standard such as 'race, religion or other arbitrary classification."'220
These cases share a fundamental concern that a rational connection
must exist between the government's purpose and the means chosen
to achieve that purpose. This requirement of a rational relation helps
to ensure fair and equal treatment of individuals subject to
legislation by ferreting out legislation that is based on bias and
prejudice, requiring instead that similarly situated individuals be
treated equally and ensuring that laws will be rational and fairly
applied.
4. First Amendment Speech
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, made applicable
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,221 provides in
pertinent part that, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech."222 Due to the deeply rooted nature of the
constitutional protection of speech, concerns about arbitrary or
content-based limitations are particularly heightened.223 Thus, in a
variety of different contexts, the Court's First Amendment

jurisprudence focuses on ways to limit or protect against subjective
governmental control of the permissible scope of speech. Many of the
constitutionally required limitations on governmental action require
the fair application of standards and prohibit subjective or contentbased decision-making.

might arise without standards to govern discretion).
216. Id. at 366-67.
217. Id. at 368.
218. Wayte, 470 U.S. at 598-99.
219. Id. at 610.
220. Id. at 608 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)).
221. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334,
336 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384,
387 (1993); Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Resources of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 877-78 (1990).
222. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
223. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
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The vagueness doctrine stems in part from the Due Process
Clause and protects speakers from arbitrary enforcement of vague
standards.224 As in other contexts, a statute implicating speech is
facially invalid if people of ordinary intelligence are unable to
understand what conduct is prohibited225 or if a law authorizes or
encourages arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.226 Where a
vague law applies to activity protected by the First Amendment,
there is the additional concern that the lack of clarity might inhibit
the exercise of guaranteed freedoms 227 and courts will apply the
vagueness standard even more stringently than in other contexts. 228
Arbitrariness concerns have also been addressed within the
context of prior restraint doctrine. A significant aspect of that
doctrine is the need to guard against arbitrary or content-based
governmental restrictions by requiring licensing and permit schemes

224. For a discussion of the vagueness doctrine in general, see supra notes 102-118
and accompanying text. See also Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 588 (1998) ("Under the First and Fifth Amendments, speakers are protected from
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of vague standards.") (citing NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-433 (1963)).
225. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("[Blecause we
assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we insist that
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is
prohibited, so that he may act accordingly."); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399,
402-03 (1966) ("It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due
Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as
to the conduct it prohibits .... ).
226. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09 ("[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is
to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A
vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and
juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of
arbitrary and discriminatory application.").
227. Id. ("[W]here a vague statute 'abut(s) upon sensitive areas of basic First
Amendment freedoms,'
it 'operates to inhibit the exercise of (those) freedoms.'
Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to 'steer far wider of the unlawful
zone'.. . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.")
(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
228. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 499
(1982) ("If... the law interferes with the right of free speech or of association, a more
stringent vagueness test should apply."); Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129-30 (1992) (stating that an "impermissible risk of
suppression of ideas" exists where "an ordinance.., delegates overly broad discretion
to the decisionmaker"); Families Achieving Independence & Respect v. Neb. Dept. of
Soc. Servs., 91 F.3d 1076, 1079-80 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that unwritten agency policy
used to exclude plaintiff from access to building lobby violated First Amendment by
being vague and subject to arbitrary enforcement); IDK, Inc. v. Clark County, 836 F.2d
1185, 1198 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that a law that lacks sufficient guidelines to
prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement can be facially challenged under the
First Amendment).
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that contain adequate substantive and procedural safeguards.229
Substantive safeguards require narrow, objective and definite
standards to protect against capricious governmental restrictions
and ensure non-arbitrary decision-making.230 The procedural
safeguards are designed to ensure that any limitation on speech is
done so sparingly. For example, prior restraints can only be imposed
temporarily,231 such restraints must allow for prompt judicial
review,232 a presumption exists against the constitutional validity of
prior restraints of expression,233 and any burden of proof is on the
person attempting to suppress the speech.234
Likewise, in the context of both content-based restrictions and
permit applications, the issue of arbitrariness relates to the validity
of the delegation of authority. In order to be proper, a legislative or
administrative delegation of permit-granting authority must be
coupled with clear guidelines which limit official discretion in order
to prevent arbitrary discrimination.235 A permit scheme will be
229. NationalistMovement, 505 U.S. at 130 (finding that a permit scheme "may not
delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official"); FW/PBS, Inc. v.
City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990) (finding that the "prior restraints doctrine"
guards against the threat of government censorship by requiring that public licensing
and permit schemes contain adequate substantive and procedural safeguards against
arbitrary, or content-based, state action); see also New Eng. Reg'l Council of
Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2002).
230. NationalistMovement, 505 U.S. at 131 ("To curtail that risk, 'a law subjecting
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license' must
contain 'narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority."')
(quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)).
231. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965) ("Any restraint imposed in
advance of a final judicial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to
preservation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound
judicial resolution.").
232. Id. at 58 ("The teaching of our cases is that, because only a judicial
determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom
of expression, only a procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a
valid final restraint. To this end, the exhibitor must be assured, by statute or
authoritative judicial construction, that the censor will, within a specified brief period,
either issue a license or go to court to restrain showing the film."); A Quantity of
Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1964); Bantam Books, Inc. v.
Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963); Cannabis Action Network, Inc. v. City of Gainesville,
231 F.3d 761, 772 (11th Cir. 2000) (explaining that prior restraint on speech, unlike
other restrictions, is subject to facial challenge, on the theory that when prior restraint
allegedly contains risk of delay or arbitrary censorship, every application of the statute
creates impermissible risk of suppression of ideas).
233. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 57 ("[A]ny system of prior restraints of expression
comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity."')
(quoting Bantam, 372 U.S. at 70).
234. Id. at 58 (finding that the burden of proving that the speech is unprotected
expression lies with the censor).
235. See, e.g., Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 132-133, 137 (finding that an
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considered facially invalid in the absence of clear standards to guide
the discretion of the government official administering the permit
scheme.236 The government is prohibited from making content-based
restrictions on speech because it allows the government to select
which speech it supports.237 Governmental limitations on the time,
place and manner also raise concerns about arbitrary limitations on
speech. While the government can utilize time, place and manner
restrictions so long as the restrictions are not arbitrary,238 courts will
uphold the validity of a restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest and if ample alternatives for
communication exist.239
Finally, even when the government acts in a proprietary fashion
it remains subject to some First Amendment constraints. The
fundamental limitation imposed when the government is acting in a

ordinance that failed to provide standards for the application of a parade or assembly
permit fee vested unconstitutional unbridled discretion in a government official); Kunz
v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951) (explaining that legally unrestrained discretion
delegated to administrative bodies or officials to regulate activities protected by the
First Amendment violates the constitution); Stonewall Union v. City of Columbus, 931
F.2d 1130, 1134 (6th Cir. 1991) (remarking that unguided administrative permitawarding discretion enables illegitimate governmental discrimination animated by
anticipated speech content or the speaker's politics).
236. See Kunz, 340 U.S. at 294-95; see also Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
394 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1969) (condemning permit systems that give an administrative
official discretion to grant or deny a permit based on broad criteria unrelated to the
regulatory purpose of the permit); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 322 (1958)
(finding that an ordinance that regulates enjoyment of constitutional freedoms, if
contingent on the discretionary grant of a permit by an official, is an unconstitutional
censorship of those freedoms); Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516
(1939) (finding that the process of issuing permits allowed for the arbitrary
suppression of free speech).
237. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48-49 (1986) ("[Tlhe
fundamental principle that underlies [the] concern about 'content-based' speech
regulations: that 'government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views
it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more
controversial views."') (quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96
(1972)).
238. Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649 (1981)
(stating that a government regulation that allows for arbitrary application is
"inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such
discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of
view"); Church of Am. Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. City of Gary, Ind., 334 F.3d 676, 683
(7th Cir. 2003) (finding that the requirement of 45 days advance notice requirement,
as a time, place and manner restriction, was arbitrary).
239. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130 ("[Any permit scheme controlling the
time, place and manner of speech must not be based on the content of the message,
must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave
open ample alternatives for communication.") (citing United States v. Grace, 461 U.S.
171, 177 (1983)).
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proprietary fashion is that the restraints must not be arbitrary or
capricious.240 Thus, despite the fact that the government may be
acting in a proprietary manner, it is still subject to the basic
limitation that its restrictions on free speech cannot be arbitrary.241
In each of these areas courts are concerned about arbitrary
limitations upon free speech. The mechanisms by which courts police
arbitrariness focus on the creation of narrow and specific standards
to guide discretion and limit the opportunities for subjective, contentbased limits upon speech. The creation of these standards allows for
clear rules and equal application of these rules to similarly situated
individuals.
B. The Principlesof Non-Arbitrariness
The preceding sections provided an analysis of the diverse
arenas in which courts address concerns relating to arbitrary
governmental actions. Examining these varied doctrines, several
underlying themes emerge. In each of the various substantive areas,
the essential judicial concerns center around concepts of rationality,
clarity, predictability, equality, accountability and reviewability.
Courts have attempted to address these concerns in a variety of
ways. This section will identify and develop four principles of nonarbitrariness. First, there must be a rational relation between the
government's action or classification and the purported interest.
Second, laws, and the rules or standards to implement them, must be
clear to create a predictable system. This principle allows individuals
to conform their behavior accordingly and requires enforcement
officials to be guided by objective rather than subjective standards.
Third, these rules must be equitably and fairly applied. Finally, there
must be accountability based on the rules and the ability of judges to
review governmental action in accordance with such rules. The
Article will address each of these principles below.
1. Rationality
Embedded in both the substantive Due Process and Equal

240. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974) (determining that
a city acting in a proprietary manner can restrict advertising options on a city bus so
long as the policies and practices governing access to the transit system's advertising
space are not arbitrary, capricious, or invidious); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.
720, 725-26 (1990) (finding that the government, even when acting in its proprietary
capacity, does not enjoy absolute freedom from First Amendment constraints, as does a
private business, but its action is valid in these circumstances unless it is arbitrary,
capricious, or invidious).
241. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303 ("Because state action exists, however, the policies
and practices governing access to the transit system's advertising space must not be
arbitrary, capricious, or invidious.").
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Protection Clauses are concepts and requirements of rationality.
Under the rational basis standard of review employed in both
doctrines, courts must determine if the governmental action or
classification is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
interest. 242 The requirement of rationality creates limitations on
arbitrary governmental action by mandating that decision-making
not be subjective or indiscriminate.243 This rational relation
requirement is illustrated in a variety of contexts. In the substantive
due process area, courts require a rational relationship between the
means and the ends of the legislation in order to ensure that laws are
not based on arbitrary or irrational justification.244 In the equal

242. For application of the rational basis standard in the substantive due process
context, see City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 676 (1976)
(finding that substantive due process proscriptions dictate that a state or local
legislative measure is judicially voidable on its face if it necessarily compels results in
all cases which are "arbitrary and capricious, bearing no relation to the police power");
Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co, 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding that land-use
regulations violate the Due Process Clause if they are "clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or
general welfare"). See also Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1988)
(finding that tenure decisions at a public university, made on the basis of an
individual's sex, can constitute arbitrary and capricious conduct that can violate
substantive due process and equal protection doctrines); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529
F.2d 448, 449 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding academic dismissals from state institutions can
be enjoined if "shown to be clearly arbitrary and capricious"); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513
F.2d 843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding that if the decision is about academic standards
courts will only intervene if the decision was arbitrary). For application of the rational
basis standard in the equal protection context, see Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988) ("[A]rbitrary and irrational discrimination violates
the Equal Protection Clause under even our most deferential standard of review.");
Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 522 (7th Cir. 1982) ("Equal protection
demands at a minimum that [government] must apply its laws in a rational and
nonarbitrary way.").
243. This rationality requirement arises in a variety of contexts. For examples of
cases involving prosecutorial discretion, see Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 191
(1992); Wayte v. United States 470 U.S. 598 (1985); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357 (1978); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). For an example of a case
involving zoning, see City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432
(1985).
244. See, e.g., Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. at 676 (acknowledging that
substantive due process proscriptions dictate that a state or local legislative measure
is judicially voidable if it is "arbitrary and capricious, bearing no relation to the police
power"); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) ("[R]egulatory
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced
unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is
of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational
basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators."); W. Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ("Liberty under the Constitution is thus necessarily
subject to the restraints of due process, and regulation which is reasonable in relation
to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process."); Vill. of
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protection area, courts require that a government classification be
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest so that
similarly situated individuals are not treated differently.245 In the
prosecutorial discretion context, governmental decisions not
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest are arbitrary
and thus violate the Equal Protection Clause.246 In each of these
examples, the rational relation requirement allows courts to regulate
governmental arbitrariness by placing a check on indiscriminate
action.
2. Clear Rules and Standards
The requirement that laws and regulations be set out with
clarity is a theme woven throughout legal jurisprudence. It addresses
concerns that individuals should be able to adapt their behavior and
that enforcement officials should have objective standards to guide
their decision-making.247

Euclid, 272 U.S. at 395 (finding that land-use regulations violate the Due Process
Clause if they are "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare"); see also Gutzwiller, 860 F.2d
at 1328 (finding that denial of tenure at public university made on the basis of
individual's sex is arbitrary and capricious and can violate substantive due process);
Mahavongsanan,529 F.2d at 449 (finding academic dismissals from state institutions
can be enjoined if "shown to be clearly arbitrary or capricious"); Gaspar, 513 F.2d at
850 (finding that if the decision is about academic standards courts will only intervene
if the decision was arbitrary).
245. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 110 (2000) (holding that procedures for
presidential ballot recount violated the Equal Protection Clause); Vill. of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (holding that a homeowner can bring a claim under
equal protection as a class of one if a governmental entity required a different
commitment than from other homeowners); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr.,
Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (overturning state statute that prevented homes for the
mentally retarded from being zoned in a particular area because the Court could not
find a rational basis for believing that the group home posed a specific threat to the
city's legitimate interests); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 451-55 (1972)
(overturning state statute that allowed married persons to receive contraceptives but
prevented single persons from obtaining contraceptives as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause because the law does not have a rational basis for treating similarly
situated individuals differently).
246. See, e.g., Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186-87 (1992 ) (holding that a
prosecutor's decision not to move for a reduced sentence where the defendant provided
information about other crimes, may have been based on the government's assessment
of costs of moving for a reduced sentence, thus constituting a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental interest); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)
(asserting that a prosecutor consciously exercising selectivity in law enforcement is not
a constitutional violation as long as the selectivity is not based on an arbitrary
classification); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) (holding that selectivity in enforcing
West Virginia's recidivist statute did not in itself violate equal protection unless based
on an unjustifiable standard such as religion or race).
247. The Court has reasoned that there must be sufficient standards for the public
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The premise that individuals should have clear knowledge of the
laws that apply to them, in order to adequately conform their
behavior, underlies many of the substantive legal areas discussed
above. Without such a requirement, "the law [is] so arbitrary that
citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon bias or
whim."248 For example, a basic principle underlying the vagueness
doctrine is that laws should be sufficiently clear to provide people of
ordinary intelligence with a reasonable opportunity to understand
what conduct is prohibited.249 Thus, if a law is so lacking in
standards that individuals cannot be certain what conduct is
prohibited, it violates the vagueness doctrine.250 Similar concerns
about fair notice to the public also exist in the punitive damages and
choice of law contexts where significant jurisprudence requires fair
notice251 and predictability.252 Finally, one of the basic requirements
of the nondelegation doctrine is that delegations to administrative
agencies be accompanied by "intelligible principles." As in the above
contexts, this "intelligible principles" requirement is designed to
allow individuals subject to administrative decision-making to be

to know what conduct is prohibited. See Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03
(1966) ("It is established that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process
Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the
conduct it prohibits .... ). The Court has used the rationale that there must be
sufficient standards for enforcement purposes. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108 (1972) ("[I1f arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented,
laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them.").
248. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to classify arbitrariness
as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due process-of the law in general-is to allow citizens
to order their behavior. A State can have no legitimate interest in deliberately making
the law so arbitrary that citizens will be unable to avoid punishment based solely upon
bias or whim.").
249. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939) (finding that a law
fails to meet the requirements of due process if it is so vague and standardless that the
public is uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits); Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 402-03 (finding
that a laws fails to comport with due process requirements if it is so vague that it
leaves the public unaware of what conduct is prohibited).
250. Giaccio, 382 U.S. at 402-03 ("It is established that a law fails to meet the
requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless that it
leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits .... ").
251. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 414 (2003) ('The
reason is that '[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will
subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may
impose.") (quoting BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 574 (2003)).
252. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 306-07 (1981) (noting that the
predictability of the result is one of the factors considered by a lower court in
examining conflict-of-law issues).
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better able to plan their affairs.253
In addition to providing fair notice, clear laws serve to avoid
arbitrary enforcement by providing government officials with
guidelines to direct their discretion. These guidelines limit
subjective, indiscriminate and capricious enforcement of the laws
through the creation of standards upon which officials can base their
decisions. The concern for avoiding subjective and indiscriminate
enforcement is addressed in a number of the substantive areas
discussed above. For example, in the context of First Amendment
protected speech, courts are unwilling to allow content-based
discretion for fear that decisions will be based on bias or prejudice.254
Instead, narrow, objective and definite standards are required to
protect against capricious governmental restrictions and ensure nonarbitrary decision-making.255 Similarly, under the vagueness
doctrine, courts require clear and legally-fixed standards to protect
against indiscriminate governmental action. 256 This requirement of
clear rules and standards regulates arbitrary governmental action by
creating sufficient clarity, so that individuals can conform their
behavior and government enforcement officials have standards to
guide their discretion.257

253. Sunstein, supra note 151, at 337 (asserting that the nondelegation doctrine
promotes planning by citizens "subject to the law, by providing them a sense of what is
permitted and forbidden").
254. See, e.g., Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 133
(1992) (reasoning that a county ordinance without standards or objective factors allows
officals to encourage and discourage certain views through arbitrary setting of fees);
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951) (explaining that legally unrestrained
discretion delegated to administrative bodies or officials to regulate activities protected
by the First Amendment violates the constitution); Stonewall Union v. City of
Columbus, 931 F.2d 1130, 1134 (6th Cir. 1991) (remarking that unguided
administrative permit-awarding discretion enables illegitimate governmental
discrimination animated by anticipated speech content or the speaker's politics).
255. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 132-33 (finding that a permit scheme may
not delegate overly broad licensing discretion to a government official); FW/PBS, Inc.
v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 225-26 (1990) (finding that "prior restraint doctrine" guards
against the threat of government censorship by requiring that public licensing and
permit schemes contain adequate substantive and procedural safeguards against
arbitrary, or content-based, state action); see also New Eng. Reg'l Council of
Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 21, 25 (finding that permits regulating leafleting are
proper if they are based on narrow, objective and definite criteria) (1st Cir. 2002).
256. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) ("[I]f arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit
standards ..
" ); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1972)
(holding that the terms "poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers" provide
insufficient guidance to police officers and leaves enforcement susceptible to bias and
prejudice).
257. Kinton, 284 F.3d at 25-26.
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3. Fair and Equitable Application

A number of the substantive legal areas discussed above
evidence attempts to avoid the arbitrary and inequitable treatment
of similarly situated people on the basis of prejudice, bias or
discrimination. The substantive area of law in which courts most
frequently address these issues is in equal protection doctrine where,
at a minimum, irrational or arbitrary discrimination is prohibited25s8
and any government created distinctions must have a rational
basis.259 For example, in the voting context, the requirement of equal
and fair application of the law ensures that each individual vote
carries the same weight regardless of geography.260 Likewise, courts
require that zoning regulations be fairly and evenly applied26l and
that prosecutors avoid selective enforcement of criminal laws.262

258. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (holding that the
Equal Protection Clause can be the basis of a claim for an individual even where the
individual does not allege membership in a class or group where the action of the
government was "irrational and wholly arbitrary"). In allowing such claims, the Court
explained that "'the purpose of the equal protection clause.., is to secure every person
within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through
duly constituted agents."' Id. at 564 (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County,
260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)).
259. See supra notes 182, 194-207 and accompanying text.
260. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (finding that the use of
standardless manual recounts violates the Equal Protection Clause through its
recognition that the Equal Protection Clause required uniform rules and non-arbitrary
treatment). The Court stated, "[e]qual protection applies as well to the manner of its
exercise. Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not, by
later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another."
Id. See also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 819 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562-63 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 709-10 (1964); Gray v. Sanders,
372 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1963).
261. Vill. of Willowbrook, 528 U.S. at 564-65 (determining that the government's
actions violated the Equal Protection Clause because there was no rational, nonarbitrary, basis for the different easements required by the municipality); City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 471 n.23 (1985) (holding that
mental retardation is not a quasi-suspect classification calling for a more exacting
standard of judicial review than is normally accorded to economic and social
legislation, but that under the rational basis test, requiring a special use permit for a
proposed group home for the mentally retarded violates Equal Protection Clause in
that the requirement, in absence of any rational basis in the record for believing that
the group home would pose any special threat to city's legitimate interests, appeared
to rest on an irrational prejudice against mentally retarded).
262. For a discussion of how constitutional limitations upon the use of prosecutorial
discretion emanate from the Equal Protection Clause, see Amsterdam, supra note 208,
at 305. For an analysis of how equal protection is used to limit selective enforcement,
see Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) ("[A] defendant would be entitled
to relief if a prosecutor refused to file a substantial-assistance motion, say, because of
the defendant's race or religion."); People v. Abram, 680 N.Y.S.2d 414 (N.Y. Misc.,
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The requisite of fair and equitable application also exists outside
the equal protection framework. For example, in the punitive
damages context courts attempt to prevent wide variations in
damages awards and will find that an irrationally excessive award
violates due process. 263 Similarly, the nondelegation doctrine's
"intelligible principles" requirement promotes concepts of equality by
requiring administrative agencies to be guided by standards that
limit discretion.264 In each of these substantive areas, the
requirement of fair and equitable application of the rules promotes
the goal of avoiding the arbitrary and differential treatment of
similarly situated individuals.
4. Accountability and Reviewability
The legal system depends upon the ability of the public to hold
government officials accountable and the ability of our judicial
system to review governmental action to assure its legal validity.265
These concepts of accountability and reviewability are rooted in
separation of powers principles.266 The concept of accountability
1998) (finding that criminal defendants are entitled to equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment and interpreting this provision as forbidding public authority
from applying or enforcing an admittedly valid law "with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances").
263. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003) (noting
that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process prohibits "the imposition of grossly
excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor").
264. See Seidenfeld & Rossi, supra note 148, at 4-5 (explaining that the
nondelegation doctrine serves rule of law values and promotes concepts of equality by
ensuring equal application of the laws to similarly situated individuals); Sunstein,
supra note 151, at 337 (explaining that the nondelegation doctrine serves equality
values by cabining discretionary governmental authority and reducing arbitrary or
capricious decision-making).
265. The nondelegation doctrine promotes judicial review of governmental action
and enables the public to hold government officials accountable. See, e.g., United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 274-76 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in result);
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 547, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part). Judge
William's decision in American Trucking Associations v. EPA provides an analysis of
the issue of judicial review of governmental action. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA,
175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), modified and reh'g denied, 195 F.3d
4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), cert. granted sub nom., Browner v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 529 U.S. 1129 (2000), cert. granted, Am. Trucking Ass'ns, v. Browner, 530 U.S.
1202 (2000) (stating that constraints on agencies are normatively desirable because
they minimize arbitrary decision-making by the agency, enhance the likelihood of
meaningful judicial review and help to assure that government is responsive to the
popular will).
266. Some drafters of the Federalist Papers recognized that separation of powers
was designed to police arbitrary action. THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison)
('Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control."') (quoting Montesquieu). See also
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requires that government actors ultimately have political
agencies,
responsibility. In the context of administrative
bureaucratic
non-elected
that
to
ensure
accountability is designed
agents are not permitted to make laws. The nondelegation doctrine
regulates this by mandating that only elected officials, subject to the
political will of the people, should enact laws267 and that any
legislative delegation of authority be accompanied by "intelligible
principles" to guide the administrators.268 In this way, questions of
social policy are made only by those government officials responsible
to democratic political will. If there were no such limitations and
unelected administrative officials were permitted to act without
oversight, their control of the laws would be impermissibly
expansive.269 In these ways, accountability mandates curb the worst
instances of arbitrary action by unelected government officials.270
In addition to accountability, the legal system relies upon
judicial review of agency action to ensure that governmental actions
accord with legal and constitutional limits.271 Concerns about
effective reviewability arise in the vagueness and nondelegation
contexts.272 The vagueness doctrine's requirement that there exist
clear and specific legal standards is designed to ensure effective court
review of agency action.273 Similarly, the nondelegation doctrine's
requirement that delegations to administrative agencies be
accompanied by "intelligible principles" enhances the likelihood of
meaningful judicial review by requiring standards upon which courts
can assess compliance.274 In the absence of such standards courts
Bressman, supra note 140, at 1408; Farina, supra note 141, at 479 n.105 (identifying
that the Supreme Court attributes the nondelegation doctrine to separation of powers).
267. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 276 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring in
result); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
268. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409-10 (1928).
269. See Robel, 389 U.S. at 281-82 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
270. See id.
271. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 626 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part).
272. Id.
273. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (reasoning that a law fails to
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague and standardless
that the public is uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits or if it permits judges and
jurors to decide cases without any legally fixed standards); see also Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402-03 (1966) (voiding on grounds of vagueness a statute
which permitted a jury to impose court costs upon a defendant); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964).
274. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) ("So long
as Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the
person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform,
such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power."). The Court
has also discussed how this standard allows courts to effectively review agency action.
See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. at 626 (Harlan, J., dissenting in part) (finding
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have no ability to determine whether an agency action comports with
the law.
IV. DISCRETION AND ARBITRARINESS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
WELFARE

The changes made to the welfare system in 1996, with the
passage of the Welfare Reform Act, created a system of devolution
and increased discretion while at the same time calling into question
the long-established procedural due process protection previously
relied upon by welfare recipients. While devolution and increased
discretion alone are not inherently problematic, and may even be
beneficial,275 the convergence of devolution, increased discretion and
the questionable benefit of reliance on procedural due process raise
concerns about how to hold local welfare administrators accountable.
With these ongoing questions about bureaucratic accountability, the
new welfare program creates a particularly well suited paradigm
through which to explore principles of non-arbitrariness.
This section compares the pre-1996 model of welfare
administration to the post-1996 model and notes the features of this
new model that have increased caseworker discretion and decreased
their accountability. Because neither constitutional procedural due
process protections nor administrative law protections assuredly
resolve the problem of local governments operating without rules,
regulations, policies or procedures, this section looks to other
substantive areas of the law that have grappled with similar issues
of discretion. The section concludes by applying the principles
derived from these substantive areas to the current welfare system.
By application of these principles to the administration of a welfare
system without rules, regulations, policies or procedures, it becomes
apparent that the system in place is impermissibly irrational,
unclear, inequitable and unaccountable.
A. The New Model of Welfare Administration - Increased
Discretion
Passage of the Welfare Reform Act changed the cash assistance
program to adults with dependent children from AFDC to TANF. In
addition to the name change, many programmatic changes were
made. Several of the changes to the TANF program have the
potential to lead to increased arbitrary action by government

that adequate standards provides the means to assess how the agencies have complied
with the legislative mandates); Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 104-06
(1946) (requiring Congress to clearly delineate the policy in which an agency generally
must follow).
275. See supranote 28 and accompanying text.
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officials.276 In fact, empirical data evaluating the implementation of
welfare reform raises concerns that such arbitrary governmental
action is in fact occurring.277 These features that exacerbate the
potential for arbitrary action include: a shift from rule-based
decision-making to discretionary decision-making by welfare
administrators; a change from eligibility based on written criteria to
eligibility based on contract terms defined by the government; and
the new devolved, and at times privatized, system of welfare
administration. This section will discuss briefly each of these
features.
The new administrative model abandons the prior model's
reliance on rules, instead vesting local welfare administrators with
increased discretion.278 Under the prior model, non-professional
welfare administrators provided benefits based on a set of generally
applicable rules279 that formed the basis of a legally recognized

276. Given the fact that welfare administration now occurs at the state, local, and
at times privatized levels, there is no one system that can be analyzed. Because states
vary widely in the implementation of TANF, there can be no absolute assertions that
will apply in every welfare context. However, as one author has noted some "trends"
can be identified. Diller, supra note 19, at 1147.
277. REBECCA GORDON, APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: How
WELFARE "REFORM" PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 18, available at http://www.arc.org/
downloads/arc010201.pdf (Feb. 1, 2001) ("How well has devolution worked? Have
different jurisdictions around the country in fact developed varied policies that fit the
needs of local welfare clients? Survey results demonstrate that policies do indeed vary
at every level by state, by county, by individual welfare office, down to the daily
decisions made by each caseworker. In fact, the one quality common to the welfare
system in all the locations where the survey was given is their overwhelmingly
arbitrary nature. Rather than bringing forth a more finely-tuned set of policies, the
survey suggests that in many cases devolution has exacerbated existing inequalities
and created new ones."); APPLIED RESEARCH CENTER, FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS:
How CALIFORNIA'S WELFARE POLICY KEEPS FAMILIES POOR 29, available at
http://www.arc.org/welfare/downloads/fallingthrucracks.pdf
(July
14,
2003)
[hereinafter FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS] ('The application of welfare rules and
regulations in the state of California is rife with arbitrary decisions, errors, and illegal
practices on the part of county administrators.").
278. Diller, supra note 19, at 1126-27 ('The administrative regimes that are
replacing [the old administrative model] tend to have a number of common
characteristics. The new regimes tend to give much greater power to ground-level
employees. These employees are accorded broad discretion to make judgments in
individual cases. They are encouraged to influence recipients through persuasion and
advice and have broader powers to sanction recipients viewed as uncooperative. A
system that was principally legal in nature is becoming delegalized, shorn of the rules
and procedures that characterize a system of laws.").
279. In the late 1960s, the model of welfare administration changed from a social
work model in which professional social workers applied broad discretionary rules to a
legal bureaucratic model in which non-professional welfare administrators provided
benefits based on a set of generally applicable rules. Id. at 1135-40.
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entitlement.280 This shift from the former rule-based model to one
based on discretionary decision-making entails several elements.
Initially, the new model creates substantive provisions that require
discretionary decisions. For example, in the context of a welfare
administrator implementing work requirements, a number of
discretionary decisions arise including: whether a client is able to
work; what types of activities constitute "work activities"; whether
suitable child care is available to the recipient; and, if the issue of
missed appointments arises, whether the recipient had a valid
excuse.281 Likewise, a welfare caseworker has discretion to determine
which recipients are exempt from the time limits282 or are eligible for
an up-front one time lump sum welfare diversion,283 thus controlling
which applicants will proceed with the filing of an application and
which will be dissuaded from ever filing in the first place.284 Further,
unlike the prior welfare model where workers had a single discrete
function, workers now have responsibility for a range of
administrative functions following a client from application through
termination.285 This broadening of caseworker authority means that
a single caseworker can have enormous influence over a recipient's

280. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (stating that "benefits are a
matter of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them"); King v. Smith,
392 U.S. 309, 317 (1968) (finding that federal statutory criteria mandated that
benefits be provided to all eligible individuals).
281. Diller, supra note 19, at 1148.
282. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(C)(i), (iii) (2000). The statute includes a hardship
exception that permits a state to exempt a family from the sixty month time limit if a
hardship exists or if the family includes an individual who has been "battered or
subjected to extreme cruelty," as defined by the statute. Id. The statute permits
states to exempt only twenty percent of their caseload. Id. § 608(a)(7)(C)(ii); see also
45 C.F.R. 264.1(c) (2003); 64 Fed. Reg. 17,845-48 (Apr. 12, 1999).
283. Diversion programs are designed to keep potential welfare applicants from
ever getting on the welfare rolls by providing an up-front, lump sum payment in lieu of
ongoing cash assistance. For a review of various state diversion programs, see STATE
POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, FORMAL CASH DIVERSION PROGRAMS, available at
Diller
http://www.spdp.org/tanf/divover/divover.pdf (last visited Nov. 24, 2004).
explains that there are several types of diversion policies all of which seek to dissuade
the applicant from filing an application. Diller, supra note 19, at 1152-57. The first
type of diversion occurs when the welfare caseworker offers the applicant a one time
cash assistance payment in lieu of ongoing cash assistance. Id. at 1153. Thus, the
client never even applies for welfare and instead takes the one time payment. A
second policy that serves as a diversion is the requirement that applicants engage in
job search activities while their application is pending. Id. at 1154. A final component
of many diversion programs is the focus on alternative resources available to the
client. Id. at 1155.
284. See Diller, supra note 19, at 1153.
285. Id. at 1161-62 (explaining that the aggregation of tasks into one case worker's
role has occurred in whole or in part in a number of states including Oregon,
Massachusetts and Wisconsin).
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case, thus multiplying the impact of his or her discretion. While there
certainly are many workers who try to do the "right" thing with their
discretion, in the absence of actual rules to guide such discretion,
there exists a risk of arbitrary action even on the part of wellintentioned caseworkers.286
A second programmatic shift with the potential to substantially
increase arbitrary action is the change from eligibility based on a
written set of criteria to eligibility based on contract terms decided by
the government. Under the new welfare system, in order to receive
assistance recipients must meet a set of individually negotiated
contractual obligations that form the basis for the maintenance of
assistance,287 as well as potential sanctions.288 These obligations are

286. See Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Inside the Welfare Contract: Discretion and
Accountability in State Welfare Administration, 71 SOC. SERV. REV. 1, 7 (1997) (calling
into question "[t]he notion that increased discretion is a positive feature of welfare
casework" by providing historical examples of the biased, arbitrary and capricious
decisions made by caseworks given discretion); JOEL F. HANDLER & ELLEN JANE
HOLLINGSWORTH, THE "DESERVING POOR": A STUDY OF WELFARE ADMINISTRATION
Flexible
205-11 (1971) ("The malaise of welfare administration is staggering.
administration, which is supposed to work to the advantage of the client, really works
to permit regulation at whim and to increase client dependency. The bureaucracy is at
present uncontrollable and therefore arbitrary and unjust.").
287. The Welfare Reform Act requires that each individual be assessed, prior to
receipt of assistance, to determine his or her "skills, prior work experience, and
employability." 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(1) (2000). On the basis of this assessment, the
state agency may develop a formal agreement that sets forth the employment goals of
the recipient, the obligations of the recipient, and "describes the services the state will
provide" to the recipient. Id. §608(b)(2)(A)(i)-(v). All fifty states and the District of
Columbia require some type of written agreement that is signed by the recipient. See
STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, FINDINGS IN BRIEF: TANF APPLICATIONS,
available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/applications/appsumm.htm (last modified Mar.
03, 2000) [hereinafter TANF APPLICATIONS]. Sixteen states require recipients to sign
"employability contracts" only, which focus exclusively on employment related issues.
Id. Eighteen states require "responsibility contracts," which proscribe conduct in
matters in addition to employment obligations. Id. These additional matters include
child school attendance, child immunization, cooperation with child support
enforcement, parenting training and agreements to achieve self-sufficiency. Seventeen
states require recipients to sign both "employability plans" and "responsibility
contracts." Id.
288. For a summary of the state sanctions that accompany failure to comply with
employment contracts or personal responsibility contracts, see STATE POLICY
DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS: EXEMPTIONS AND
SANCTIONS, available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/tanfapps.htm (June 1999). For a
summary of general state sanction policies, see HEIDI GOLDBERG, CENTER ON BUDGET
AND POLICY PRIORITIES, A COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED APPROACH TO SANCTIONS IN STATE
AND COUNTY TANF PROGRAMS (Oct. 1, 2000), available at http://www.cbpp.org/3-2801tanf.pdf [hereinafter GOLDBERG, A COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED APPROACH TO SANCTIONS
In general the statute contains both
IN STATE AND COUNTY TANF PROGRAMS].
mandatory and optional sanctions that states may impose. States must impose
sanctions for: child support non-cooperation. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(2) (2000) (establishing
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created by welfare administrators and can include employmentrelated responsibilities2s9 as well as personal responsibilities such as
child school attendance, child immunization, cooperation with child
support enforcement and parenting training.290 Within this context,
welfare caseworkers take on the role of contract negotiators,291
that if "an individual is not cooperating in establishing, modifying, or enforcing a
support order with respect to a child of the individual" and no good cause exemption
applies, the state must either deduct no less than 25% of the assistance grant or
terminate assistance to the family). States must also impose sanctions for failure to
participate in work activities. Id. § 602(a)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(iv) (2000) (establishing that
states must require work after two years, and unless a state opts out, they must
require participation in community service after two months). The statute expressly
provides that a state may sanction a family if: an adult fails to ensure that minor
children attend school, or if the family includes an adult between 20-51 years of age
who does not have or is not working toward a secondary school diploma or its
equivalent unless the adult is determined by a professional to lack such capacity. Id. §
604(i)-O(j).
289. Thirty-three states require recipients to sign "employability plans," which focus
See STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION
exclusively on employment related issues.
PROJECT, EMPLOYABILITY PLANS, available at http://www.spdp.org/tanflapplications/
applicep.pdf (May 1999) (including Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
290. Thirty-five states require recipients to sign "personal responsibility contacts."
See STATE POLICY DOCUMENTATION PROJECT, PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY CONTRACTS:
OBLIGATIONS, available at http://www.spdp.org/tanf/prcreq/index.htm (June 1999)
OBLIGATIONS]
(including
CONTRACTS:
[hereinafter
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming). These requirements range
from the innocuous, such as job search obligations, to more punitive requirements,
such as child school attendance, drug and alcohol programs, and agreements to
achieve self-sufficiency.
291.

Compare WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 25, 153-54 (1965)

(explaining that during the New Deal era Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) was
administered by case workers who were trained social workers), with Diller, supra
note 19, at 1195 (explaining that unlike the old social work administrative model,
under the new TANF administrative scheme, caseworkers do not require professional
training and in many offices are not required to complete any educational training
beyond high school). Professor Gilman writes:
[FIront-line workers generally now engage in a variety of counseling and
evaluative tasks. These include educating applicants about the TANF
program; assessing their work histories and attempts to obtain employment;
reviewing their eligibility for entitlement benefits such as SSI, Medicaid, and
food stamps; determining their eligibility for cash grants, loans, or other
services to divert them from the TANF program; assisting them in securing
child support from noncustodial parents; helping them with job searches;
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wielding large amounts of discretion in defining the terms of a
contract for benefits.292 This authority to set contract terms,
especially given the lack of rules and standards governing
permissible contract terms, increases caseworker discretion and
creates the potential for arbitrary action.
Finally, the devolution of authority for welfare administration as
well as the privatization of portions of some states' welfare
administration also impact the discretion afforded administrators.
The issues raised by devolution are especially heightened in those
states that have further devolved authority from state to local
governments. 293 Discretion appears to increase as government
becomes smaller and more local because authority is more
concentrated in fewer government officials and there are fewer
checks to curb improper actions.294 The devolution of administrative
assessing their child care and transportation needs, as well as domestic
violence problems or alcohol or drug abuse; drafting individualized plants to
attain economic self-sufficiency; and assisting them in locating job training,
GED, ESL, and other skill building activities.
Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 CAL.
L. REV. 569, 580 (2001). See MARY JO BANE & DAVID T. ELLWOOD, WELFARE
REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM 8-27 (1994) (providing a historical review of
the changing role of the welfare administrator); LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935, 102-05, 162-64

(1994) (providing a historical analysis of the caseworker as social worker).
292. See Diller, supra note 19, at 1157-58 (explaining that personal responsibility
agreements or contracts represent an additional set of rules that caseworkers have the
discretion to apply).
293. See generally LOVEJOY & RYAN, supra note 13, at 9 (describing devolution
schemes in Colorado, Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin and explaining
that increased discretion is also accompanied by a lack of administrative
accountability mechanisms); see also Cimini, supra note 2, at 127-29 (detailing a
survey of the sixty-three county governments administering welfare and showing that
thirty-six of those counties were operating "without specific local policies or
procedures. Of the thirty-six operating without written policies or procedures, thirtyfour employ other incomplete tools, such as state plans, flow charts, or checklists to
assist in the administration of the program," while two counties had no written
policies, "no flow charts, no graphs, nor any inter-office memoranda to guide workers
in the administration of the program." Further, there were five counties "using old
AFDC policies to administer the new TANF program."); JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN
FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT 41-47

(1996) (describing the general problems devolution creates for domestic social
program).
294. McGuinness, supra note 179, at 266 (noting that Americans "from all walks of
life need constitutional protection from increasingly arbitrary and oppressive
government power, more often at the local level" and that smaller, local governments,
with their pervasive, harassing and potentially arbitrary or discriminatory
regulations,
pose a greater threat to civil liberties than state and federal
governments). See also Knight v. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2000) (considering
the case of a jailer who was fired for not supporting the Sheriff in a local election);
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1999) (considering the matter of a
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authority to local governments not only increases discretion, it also
decreases accountability, in part because traditional rules of
29
administrative law do not definitively constrain devolved actors. 5
For example, administrative procedure acts and freedom of
information laws often do not apply to local government or private
contractors administering welfare programs.296
This trend toward increased discretion is present both in states
that have contracted out to private corporations297 and those that
have adopted private management techniques in the administration
of welfare.298 The increase in discretion in this context is, in part,
related to the adoption of private management techniques that create
broad non-rule based systems designed to achieve identified
outcomes unrelated to fairness, equity, clarity or accountability.299
police officer who was punished for advocating civilian handgun use, contrary to the
Police Chiefs opinion); JAMES BOVARD, LOST RIGHTS 1-6, 49-51 (1994).
295. Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished
Democracy in Local Government ContractsFor Welfare-To Work Services, 28 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 1559, 1560 (2001) (stating that this erosion of administrative law structures
diminishes democracy in three ways: "If]irst, the rules of the new contractual regime
are not generated by processes that require or invite public participation, even those
analogous to the imperfect models of administrative rulemaking. Second, the new
contractual regime lacks the transparency we have come to expect of rule-bound
welfare administration .... Third, there is no effective method, and scant tools, by
which citizens can obtain needed information to judge the efficacy of the new
system.").
296. Diller, supra note 19, at 1190, 1197 n.392 (explaining that "the Supreme Court
adopted a narrow definition of 'agency' for purposes of the federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) [and found] ... that grants of federal funds 'generally do not
create a partnership or joint venture with the recipient, nor do they serve to convert
the acts of the recipient from private acts to governmental acts absent extensive,
detailed, and virtually day-to-day supervision."') (quoting Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S.
169, 179-80 (1980)).
297. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104 (a)(1)(A) (authorizing the use of TANF funds to administer
the TANF program "through contracts with charitable, religious or private
organizations"); Bezdek, supra note 295, at 1566-67 (noting that in contrast to
government agencies, private contracted service providers have the additional
component of compensation that may affect both the quality of service as well as the
entity's accountability). For historical analysis of privatization in the social services
context, see Gilman, supra note 291, at 581-92. For an overview of trends in social
SOCIAL SERVICES
service privatization, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
PRIVATIZATION: EXPANSION POSES CHALLENGES IN ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
PROGRAM RESULTS, GAO/HEHS-98-6 (1997). For analysis of the pros and cons of
privitization, see Matthew Diller, Going Private - The Future of Social Welfare Policy?,
35 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 491 (2002). For an analysis of how privitization impacts
litigation, see Steve Hitov & Gill Deford, The Impact of Privitizationon Litigation, 35
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 590 (2002).
298. Diller, supra note 19, at 1177-86 (describing the "entrepreneurial government"
model utilized in the current administration of welfare).
299. Id. at 1175 (stating that "rather than exert direct authority over tasks
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Additionally, the increase in discretion has not been accompanied by
a professionalization of welfare workers' roles or by an increase in
their education.30 Further, because important policy decision are not
always in written form, some key policy decisions will avoid public
input usually available under notice and comment requirements.301
Finally, with increasing discretion and an absence of rules, the
effectiveness of individual hearings and lawsuits to challenge
unfettered discretion decreases.302
Studies on the impact of welfare reform have shown some
disturbing problems. One study conducted in ten cities and rural
areas across the country revealed problems with discrimination,
chaos, confusion and unpredictability.33 For example, white female
respondents in Hartford, Connecticut, reported receiving cash
assistance for children who were not yet born, while African
American women had to wait for the birth and supply proof prior to
an increase in cash assistance.34 The survey also found that fifty-two
percent of Native American women and forty-seven percent of
African American women who received job training were sent to
"Dress for Success" classes, compared to only twenty-six percent of
white women.305 Likewise, one third of all respondents had been
sanctioned in some form ranging from loss of benefits to
incarceration306 and once sanctioned, more than sixty percent of the
individuals reported that they were not informed of their right to a
fair hearing.307
Another study based in California concluded that, "[t]he
application of welfare rules and regulations in the state of California
is rife with arbitrary decisions, errors, and illegal practices on the
part of county administrators."308 That report found "routine, illegal
and unjust use of sanctions," the miscalculation of legitimate
performed by lower level workers, central administrators should identify desired
outcomes and shape incentive structures so that workers strive to achieve these
outcomes").
300. Id. at 1195-96 (comparing the social work model employed during the new deal
to the entrepreneurial model's absence of professionalism).
301. Id. at 1196.
302. Id. at 1200-01 (explaining that as welfare caseworkers have responsibility for a
broader range of activities that are not subject to rules, the efficacy of hearings is
Additionally, in the absence of rules requiring a particular
undermined.
administrative response, individual hearings become a less useful means of ensuring
that similarly situated individuals are treated alike).
303. Gordon, supra note 277, at 4-5.
304. Id. at 34.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 5.
307. Id.
308.

FALLING THROUGH THE CRACKS, supra note 277, at 25.
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exemptions and the denial of job training and educational
opportunities.309
Similarly,
this author's
informal
survey
of welfare
implementation in Colorado revealed administration without policies
or procedures.3O When questioned about how they implemented the
program without guidelines or standards, some workers explained
that local policies were unnecessary because "it is just something
[they] do,"311 or because "it is common knowledge,"312 or because
"workers have been doing it so long there is no need to tell them what
to do."313 Other county workers explained that written policies are
unnecessary "because everyone is treated the same."314
These informal and preliminary studies tend to indicate that
problems may in fact exist with a system of unfettered discretion. At
the least, they illustrate the importance of further analysis of the
problem.
B. The Need For a New Solution
In light of these aspects of the new welfare administrative
model, the potential exists for increased arbitrary governmental
action.315 Here, however, unlike the procedural due process cases
309. Id. at 1-4.
310. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
311. Telephone Interview by Libby Hilton with Sandy Knight, Custer County
caseworker (July 24, 2000). A copy of the interview is on file with the author.
312. Telephone
Interview by Libby Hilton with Las Animas County
caseworker/receptionist (July 24, 2000). A copy of the interview is on file with the
author.
313. Telephone Interview by Libby Hilton with Debbie Evans, Teller County
caseworker (July 24, 2000). A copy of the interview is on file with the author.
314. Telephone Interview by Libby Hilton with Lauri Biscado, Cheyenne County
caseworker (July 24, 2000). A copy of the interview is on file with the author.
315. Debate about the relative merits and failures of rules and discretion in judicial
and administrative proceedings is currently salient in the context of mandatory
sentencing laws. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law As
Infringing On Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2004, at A14; John W. Gonzalez, ABA Chief
Welcomes Relaxed Rules on Detainees, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 7, 2004, at A33; Stuart
Taylor Jr., No More Second Chances? Thanks to Congress and Ashcroft, Federal
sentencing shows too little common sense, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 26, 2004, at 62. The
debate regarding rules versus discretion is longstanding as well. See, e.g., KENNETH
CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 25 (1969) (describing
"both the need for discretion and its dangers"); PAUL E. Dow, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE,
A CRITICAL INQUIRY 67-68 (1981) (documenting abuses of judicial discretion in criminal
proceedings); GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION, LAW AND POLICY IN
FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
6-13 (1987) (outlining various and competing
theories about bureaucratic discretion in administrative contexts); ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 14-50 (Douglas H. Shumavon & H.
Kennet eds. 1985). For a bibliographic reference to this debate, see Diller, supra note
19, at 1140 n.73.
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that grew out of the welfare rights movement, 31 6 the issue is no
longer simply the right of the individual whose benefits are denied or
terminated to notice and an opportunity to be heard. Instead, part of
the dilemma is more fundamental: how can governments be
compelled to create rules, regulations, policies or procedures to
govern their administration of a welfare benefits program?
In the first instance, one might look to constitutional procedural
due process doctrine or to the statutory protections afforded by the
administrative procedure acts for answers. 317 However, reliance upon
these protections does not adequately hold local welfare
administrators accountable. The existence of a protected property
interest sufficient to entitle welfare recipients to procedural due
process protections is no longer certain3ls in light of the
constitutional reality that the existence of a property interest
depends upon the content of the federal or state law governing the

316. See Atkins v. Parker, 472 U.S. 115, 128 (1985) (finding that food stamp benefits
are statutory entitlements, thereby creating a property interest in eligible recipients);
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (recognizing that a recipient's interest
in the continuation of disability benefits constitutes a property interest for procedural
due process purposes); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (addressing
what administrative procedures were required in a public university before refusing to
renew an untenured faculty member's contract); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
603 (1972) (finding that a property interest in renewal of a teacher's contract may exist
within a de facto tenure system); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 80-81 (1971)
(finding implicitly a property interest in benefits under the Social Security Act);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1971) (finding implicitly a property
interest in Social Security Disability benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 254
(1970) (holding that procedural due process requires a pretermination evidentiary
hearing be held when public assistance payments to welfare recipient are
discontinued); Youakim v. McDonald, 71 F.3d 1274, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding
that foster care benefits amount to an entitlement for eligible individuals to receive
benefits under state law).
317. Diller, supra note 19, at 1188-90 (explaining that both the federal and state
Administrative Procedure Acts were created to address problems of administrative
accountability and that the protections afforded by the Administrative Procedure Acts
are strengthened by freedom of information statutes and open meeting requirements
that enable the public to gain access to agency information).
318. In the two cases that have squarely addressed the existence of a property
interest in welfare post passage of the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, the existence of a
constitutionally protected property interest is unclear. Compare West Virginia ex rel.
K.M. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 575 S.E.2d 393, 402 (2002) (holding
that the welfare recipient's due process rights under the federal constitution do not
require a pre-termination hearing before ending TANF cash assistance because
Congress and the West Virginia legislature found that recipients are no longer entitled
to cash assistance), with Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469, 476-77 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002)
(holding that although there is no longer an "absolute entitlement" to welfare benefits,
"once welfare recipients have complied with statutory standards and have begun
receiving welfare benefits the right to welfare benefits [becomes] a property right
[which] cannot be compromised without procedural due process protections").
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benefits program at issue.319 Thus, in the context of welfare benefits,
a question arises as to whether or not such a benefit amounts to a
legal entitlement.
Application of these constitutional principles reveals the
conundrum created by the tension between the concept of a legal
entitlement and increased discretion. To constitute a legal
entitlement, an individual must have a "legitimate expectation" to
receive the benefit.320 This legitimate expectation must be based
upon reasonable and objective grounds, the existence of which are
determined by analyzing independent sources of law such as
legislation creating benefits.321 The Court has found an entitlement
where there exists "explicitly mandatory language in connection
with.., specific substantive predicates" designed to limit official
discretion.322 Thus, if a statute contains mandatory, substantive
criteria limiting the government's discretion, then one's expectation
is more likely to be classified as reasonable and subject to procedural
due process protections.323 In the absence of mandatory, substantive
criteria, or where government discretion is unfettered, the interest is
more likely to be interpreted as a mere desire not subject to
procedural due process protections.324 The practical implication of
this analysis is that the more discretion that is afforded
administrators, the less likely it is that procedural due process
319. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
320. See id. at 577-78 (explaining that there has to be "more than an abstract need
or desire" for the benefit); see also Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430
(1982) ('"The hallmark of property, the Court has emphasized, is an individual
entitlement grounded in state law, which cannot be removed except 'for cause."')
(quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978)).
321. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 ("Property interests.., are not created by the
Constitution. Rather they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits."). It is also arguable that the contracts entered into
between the government and the individual welfare recipient constitute a form of
property for constitutional procedural due process purposes. See Cimini, The New
Contract, supra note 3, at 249 (arguing that the concept of a social contract and the
existence of actual legal contracts between the government and individual welfare
recipients create a property interest under the Due Process Clause).
322. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983). See also Ky. Dep't of Corr. v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 454 (1989).
323. Cf. Gardner v. Mayor of Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992) (reasoning
that a claim of entitlement turns on the amount of discretion the government has in
denying or approving zoning permit).
324. See id. (explaining that where the agency has discretion it defeats the claim of
a property interest). For other examples of how discretion impacts the finding of a
property interest in municipal land use cases see also, Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d
256, 258 (11th Cir. 1989); RRI Realty Corp. v. Inc. Vill. of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911,
918 (2nd Cir. 1989); Carolan v. City of Kansas City, 813 F.2d 178, 181 (8th Cir. 1987).
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protections exist for recipients.25
If the protections afforded by the procedural Due Process Clause
only exist when government officials are bound by existing
substantive standards, then the doctrine fails to protect those most
in need. When a government bureaucrat is permitted to act without
fixed or substantive rules, and instead by her own unfettered
discretion, the procedural Due Process Clause offers little or no
protection. As one scholar has stated:
[n]o regime would seem more threatening of the citizen's
autonomy, security and dignity than being at the mercy of a
bureaucrat whose behavior is unchannelled by fixed,
substantive rules. No circumstance would seem to cry louder for
the interposition of the constitution between the individual and
government power. And yet, the more discretion positive law
confers on officials - the closer the legal regime comes to the
nightmare vision we call Kafkaseque - the more certain it is
that due process will not intervene.326
Thus, under the current framework, procedural due process
protections may not apply in the very instances where procedural
monitoring is most crucial.327
Similarly, the protections afforded by the federal Administrative
Procedure Act do not apply to states 32s and generally, state
Administrative Procedure Acts do not apply to local governments. 329

325. Cynthia Farina and Richard Fallon describe why "process is most 'needed'
where decisions are discretionary" and the judiciary's response to these reasons.
Farina, supra note 66, at 223-27; see also Fallon, supra note 33 at 328 (acknowledging
that a potential interpretation of the Due Process Clause in which protections are
offered based upon state law "would allow states to evade due process" limitations by
failing to recognize the existence of property).
326. Farina, supra note 66, at 222.
327. Mashaw, Dignitary Process, supra note 66, at 438; Lawrence Alexander, The
Relationship Between Procedural Due Process and Substantive ConstitutionalRights,
39 U. FLA. L. REV. 323, 340 (1987) (explaining that when discretion increases, more
"procedure rather than less is warranted).
328. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994) (defining agencies that are subject to the federal
administrative procedures act as "each authority of the Government of the United
States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency"). Lisa
Shultz Bressman provides an explanation of why the Administrative Procedures Act
was created. See Bressman, supra note 25, at 471-72 (explaining that one of the early
models of the administrative states was the expertise model that "conceptualized
agencies as professionals or experts, disciplined" by their specialized knowledge). The
rationale was that allowing decisions to be made by experts would protect against
arbitrary action. Id. However, the model focused on agency competence as opposed to
agency procedures and thus raised concerns about fairness and participation. Id. at
472. It was these concerns that the APA initially was designed to address. Id.
329. MODEL STATE ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 1-102 (1981) (defining agency as "a board,
commission, department, officer, or other administrative unit of this State, including
the agency head, and one or more members of the agency head or agency employees or

RUTGERS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:2

Thus, there exists a gap in protection for welfare recipients whose
benefits are administered by local governments operating with broad
discretion in the absence of rules, regulations, policies or procedures.
C. Application of Non-ArbitrarinessPrinciplesto Welfare
Administration
Absent the ability to rely on constitutional procedural due
process or statutory Administrative Procedure Act protections,
questions arise as to whether another protection prevents a
government agency from administering a cash assistance program in
a lawless manner. In particular, do the four principles of nonarbitrariness identified in section three provide some basis upon
which to regulate government officials who act arbitrarily and, if so,
what remedies or protections do they offer?
The Article concludes that the non-arbitrariness principles apply
to the administration of a cash assistance welfare program
administered without rules, regulations, policies or procedures. In
such a system, the government has a group of similarly situated
individuals, such as welfare recipients in New York City. The
government wants to identify and create distinctions between them
in order to implement the program in a meaningful way. For
example, the welfare worker might provide childcare assistance for
recipient A and not recipient B because A completed a worker
training program and B did not. The article concludes that in such a
situation the government should have guidelines that rationally
relate to their underlying purpose, that these guidelines need to be
clear and transparent, that they be fairly and equitably applied and
that they serve as the basis for accountability and reviewability.
Further, the Article concludes that the remedy offered by application
of these non-arbitrariness principles is potentially more useful than
the notice and hearing remedies provided by traditional procedural
due process. 330 In the absence of rules or regulations to govern
administration of a benefits program, the non-arbitrariness
principles mandate that government agencies create standards to
guide their welfare decisions and that there be fair and equal

other persons directly or indirectly purporting to act on behalf or under the authority
of the agency head .... The term does not include a political subdivision of the state
or any of the administrative units of a political subdivision .. ");MODEL STATE
ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 1 (1961) (defining agency as "each state [board, commission,
department, or officer], other than the legislature or the courts, authorized by law to
make rules or to determine contested cases").
330. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (holding that welfare
recipients are entitled to "timely and adequate notice detailing.., proposed
termination" of assistance "and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any
adverse witnesses and by presenting... arguments and evidence orally").
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application of those standards.
The first principle of non-arbitrariness is the requirement of
rationality. Specifically, governmental action or classification must
be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest so that
decisions are not subjective or indiscriminate.31 Though concerns as
to the subjective and indiscriminate decision-making by welfare
bureaucrats have existed for some time, these concerns are
exacerbated within the current model of welfare administration.332

331. Various cases demonstrate the application of the rational basis standard in the
substantive due process context. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S.
668, 676 (1976) (finding that substantive due process proscriptions dictate that a state
or local legislative measure is judicially voidable on its face if it necessarily compels
results in all cases which are "arbitrary and capricious, bearing no relation to the
police power"); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (holding
that land-use regulations violate the Due Process Clause if they are "clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare"); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding
that a gender-based dismissal was arbitrary); Mahavongsanan v. Hall, 529 F.2d 448,
449-50 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding academic dismissals from state institutions can be
enjoined if "shown to be clearly arbitrary or capricious"); Gaspar v. Bruton, 513 F.2d
843, 850 (10th Cir. 1975) (finding that if the decision is about academic standards
courts will only intervene if the decision was arbitrary). Various cases demonstrate
the application of the rational basis standard in the equal protection context. See
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83 (1988) ("[A]rbitrary and
irrational discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause under even our most
deferential standard of review."); Ciechon v. City of Chicago, 686 F.2d 511, 522 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("Equal protection demands at a minimum that a [government] must apply
its laws in a rational and nonarbitrary way.").
332. Many scholars have laid out concerns about inequality or unfairness in welfare
administration pre-welfare reform. See Mashaw, supra note 34, at 818-20 (raising
concern with an AFDC system that functioned on broad standards, wide discretion and
a coercive relationship between the case worker and the welfare recipient); Edward V.
Sparer, The Role of the Welfare Client's Lawyer, 12 UCLA L. REV. 361, 363-66 (1965)
(raising concern about arbitrary decision-making by caseworkers); HANDLER &
HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 286, at 200 (finding that there is an enormous amount of
discretionary authority at the local level as a result of the jurisdictional structure, the
structure of welfare rules, the nature of the work, and the lack of supervision).
Scholars have also raised concerns about inequality in welfare administration in the
post-welfare reform era. See, e.g., Susan T. Gooden, All Things Not Being Equal:
Differences in Caseworker Support Toward Black and White Welfare Clients, 4 HARV.
J. OF AFR. AM. PUB. POL'Y 23, 32 (1998) (examining Virginia's welfare administration
post-welfare reform and finding that black welfare recipients received less
discretionary transportation assistance and received less caseworker support for
increasing formal education than their white counterparts. Gooden also found that
white welfare recipients benefit considerably from the discretionary actions of their
caseworkers and concluded that if differences in caseworker discretion were not
addressed early, the differences between black and white welfare recipients may be
incorrectly attributed to work ethic, personal motivation or attitude); Brodkin, supra
note 286, at 20 (finding that welfare recipients lacked power to challenge the
administration of welfare programs); Karen Houppert, You're Not Entitled!: Welfare
"Reform" Is Leading to Government Lawlessness, THE NATION, Oct. 25, 1999
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By way of example, assume that an agency rule specified that job
training be provided only to those individuals in blue sweaters.
Though this rule would clearly be irrational, would it be
impermissible? If we were to apply the non-arbitrariness principles
discussed here, the "blue sweater rule" would be irrational and, thus,
impermissible. In this manner, application of principles of rationality
would protect against irrational discretion and help ensure that
agency decisions are not entirely absurd or indiscriminate.333
The second principle of non-arbitrariness--clear rules and
standards-serves two discrete functions by first providing fair notice
to individuals so that they can conform their behavior,334 and second
requiring an objective basis for enforcement.335 Both of these
requirements are relevant to the current model of welfare
administration.
The concern that individuals have fair notice is particularly
relevant to the welfare context where recipients face a minefield of
requirements to receive and maintain their benefits. Without clear
knowledge of the rules and standards their conduct will be judged by,
welfare recipients are unable to deliberately conform their behavior
to maintain eligibility. This is especially important in light of the
reality that individuals threatened with sanctions face severe
financial consequences, including the complete termination of
assistance. 336 A system that does not allow recipients to know the
(concluding that governments and agencies implementing welfare reform are acting
lawlessly in the new devolved model of welfare administration).
333. Judges have expressed concerns regarding absolute discretion. See United
States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Law has
reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the unlimited discretion of
some rule, some civil or military official, some bureaucrat. Where discretion is
absolute, man has always suffered. At times it has been his property that has been
invaded; at times, his privacy; at times, his liberty of movement; at times, his freedom
of thought; at times, his life. Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more
destructive of freedom than any of man's other inventions.").
334. See, e.g., Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399, 402 (1966) ("It is established
that a law fails to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause if it is so vague
and standardless that it leaves the public uncertain as to the conduct it
prohibits .... ).
335. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (holding that an
ordinance preventing a person from making noise on grounds adjacent to a school
while in session constituted a clear standard).
336. Under the Welfare Reform Act, states are mandated to sanction recipients who
fail to engage in work activities and who fail to cooperate with child support
enforcement. 42 U.S.C. §§ 607(e), 608(a)(2) (2000). Federal law, however, prohibits a
state from imposing a sanction for refusal to comply with work requirements on a
family with a child under age six if child care is unavailable, and imposes sanctions on
states that violate this mandate. Id. § 607(e)(2); 45 C.F.R. §§ 261.15, 261.56(a)(1),
261.57 (2004). Further, the statute permits a state to reduce, by an amount the state
considers appropriate, assistance to a family when an individual fails without good
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actions that will result in punishment renders it impossible for
welfare applicants or recipients to plan their affairs and structure
their behavior to maintain eligibility.
The lack of clear rules and standards also gives rise to concerns
about subjective, indiscriminate enforcement in the administration of
welfare benefits. Without clear standards, welfare administrators,
acting as enforcement officials, are potentially guided by nothing
more than individual whims and preferences. In fact, without
objective standards, administrators have little else to rely on in
making their decisions. However, if clear and objective standards are
in place, welfare administrators have guidelines to govern their
discretion and to insulate their decisions from prejudice.
The principle that rules be fairly and equitably applied also
helps to avoid arbitrary or discriminatory treatment of similarly
situated individuals.337 Since at least the mid-1960s scholars have
recognized the potential for unequal and unfair treatment of welfare
The new model of welfare
applicants and recipients.338

cause to comply with other responsibilities mandated by his or her individual
agreement. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(b)(3) (2000). These work activities, child support
enforcement obligations, and other responsibilities comprise the obligations placed
upon recipients under the Individual Responsibility Plans. See id. § 608(b)(2)(A)(ii); see
also U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WELFARE REFORM: STATE SANCTION POLICIES
AND NUMBER OF FAMILIES AFFECTED 9 app. 11 (2000) (providing a complete list of the
federal statutory provisions regarding which sanctions are mandatory by states and
which are optional.) Various summaries detail sanctions and good cause. See e.g.,
GOLDBERG, A COMPLIANCE-ORIENTED APPROACH TO SANCTIONS IN STATE AND COUNTY

TANF PROGRAMS, supra note 288, at apps. A, B; MARK GREENBERG ET AL., CENTER FOR
LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION: AN EARLY GUIDE TO THE ISSUES
8, 11-12 (July 2000), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/welfare_
reauthorization anearlyguide.pdf (describing the position of some advocates who
claim "that the extent of state discretion in sanction policy has contributed to the
numbers of families leaving welfare without work, and to the deepening of poverty for
the poorest female-headed families"); MARK GREENBERG & STEVE SAVNER, CENTER
FOR LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, A DETAILED SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES BLOCK GRANT OF H.R. 3734, THE
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996
37-42 (Aug. 1996), available at http://www.clasp.org/pubs/TANF/detail.pdf.
337. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886) ("When we consider
the nature and the theory of our institutions of government.., they do not mean to
leave room for the play and action of purely personal and arbitrary power .... [T]he
very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems...
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails."); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (finding that there was no rational basis to
treat those who are mentally retarded differently from others who are not); U.S. Dep't
Of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (finding that equal protection guarantees
protect against "bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group").
338. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 34 (raising concern with an AFDC system that
functioned on broad standards, wide discretion and a coercive relationship between the
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administration, with increased discretion afforded to individual case
workers, only heightens these concerns.339 In the absence of written
rules or standards, decisions by individual caseworkers will likely
vary from day to day as well as between caseworkers. This inequity
will create different results between similarly situated welfare
recipients depending upon potentially impermissible or arbitrary
factors
such as caseworker bias. Given the underlying
jurisprudential concern that rules be fairly and equitably applied, it
is likely that a system without rules and standards is
impermissible.340
The fourth principle of non-arbitrariness is accountability and
reviewability of governmental action in accordance with the law. This
principle, stemming from the doctrine of separation of powers,
requires that the public be able to hold government officials
accountable and that the judiciary be able to review governmental
action to assure it comports with the law. Welfare administrators are
not exempt from such accountability concerns. In the absence of any
rules or standards that have been created through proper delegation,
welfare administrators would avoid accountability for their decisions
and recipients would be unable to exercise their political power to
change troubling or problematic welfare policies. In addition, a lack
of rules or standards upon which to judge agency action would render
meaningless the requirement that courts be able to review agency
actions. Thus, in order to meet accountability and reviewability
requirements, standards and rules must exist and be applied in a
consistent and meaningful way.
In summary, the four non-arbitrariness principles have
significant implications for the current administration of welfare
benefits. Application of these principles would promote the creation
of a rational system of welfare laws, based on clear rules and
standards, which are equitably and fairly applied and for which the
welfare administrators could be held accountable and their decisions
reviewed by the judiciary.

case worker and the welfare recipient); Sparer, supra note 332, at 363-66 (raising
concern
about
arbitrary
decisionmaking
by caseworkers);
HANDLER
&
HOLLINGSWORTH, supra note 286, at 200 (finding that there is an enormous amount of
discretionary authority at the local level as a result of the jurisdictional structure, the
structure of welfare rules, the nature of the work, and the lack of supervision).
339. See supra notes 276-86 and accompanying text.
340. In the late 1970s early 1980s a series of court decisions found the absence of
rules and standards impermissible. See, e.g., Ressler v. Pierce, 692 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir.
1982); Jensen v. Admin. of the FAA, 641 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1981); Carey v. Quern, 588
F.2d 230 (7th Cir. 1978); White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1976); Burke v.
United States, 968 F. Supp. 672 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Martinez v. Ibarra, 759 F. Supp 664
(D. Colo. 1991); Baker-Chaput v. Cammett, 406 F. Supp. 1134 (D.N.H. 1976).
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V. CONCLUSION

This Article attempts to examine the legal implications of the
local administration of cash assistance welfare programs without
rules, regulations, polices or procedures to guide governmental
decision-making. A number of legal and practical changes render less
certain those procedural due process protections that traditionally
provided security to welfare applicants and recipients. Among these
changes is the fundamental question of whether welfare recipients
maintain a property interest in the receipt of benefits. Also uncertain
in the era of devolution is the applicability of federal and state
administrative procedure acts, especially in states where the
administration of benefits is devolved to local governments or is
operated by private entities. Finally, even if such traditional
protections did apply, the remedy generally offered - namely a right
to notice and a hearing - does not address the more fundamental
issue of what, if any, jurisprudential concepts exist to mandate that
the administration of government benefit programs operate
according to rules, regulations, policies or procedures.
To address these questions, this Article focuses upon concepts of
arbitrariness. Historically, prohibitions on arbitrariness are deeply
rooted in the foundational concepts of our current system of laws and
are found in modern and diverse areas of our jurisprudence. Though
pervasive in scope, the core concepts of non-arbitrariness are simple:
to promote governmental action that is rational, fair and equitable
and for which it is accountable. Through an exploration of current
judicial concerns about arbitrary governmental action, this Article
has sought to set forth themes illustrating the underlying concerns
with arbitrary governmental action. Four principles, or themes,
underlie these concerns. First, laws must be based on a rational
connection between government ends and the means employed to
achieve them. Second, the laws must be clear, creating a system
predictable enough that individuals can conform their behavior and
enforcement officials can make objective decisions. Third, laws must
be consistently and uniformly applied in a way that creates a
reasonably fair system of laws. And finally, agencies must be held
accountable and courts must be able to review claims that the agency
has failed to act in accordance with governing requirements.
The concept of arbitrariness and the themes underlying it have
significant applicability to the current model of welfare
administration with its heightened potential for arbitrary
governmental action. Courts addressing arbitrary governmental
action in a variety of substantive areas have expressed concern as to
the appropriateness of a government operating in the absence of
rules, regulations, policies or procedures. In the context of welfare
some of those concerns include: whether the rules are rational;
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whether similarly situated welfare recipients are treated alike;
whether applicants or recipients have notice of the standards
governing their behavior; and how to effectuate accountability and
reviewability in the absence of rules or standards. Within this
context, this Article proposes that application of non-arbitrariness
principles to the current administration of welfare requires, at a
minimum, the creation of rules, standards and procedures to govern
the distribution of benefits as well as the fair and equitable
application of such rules and standards to welfare applicants and
recipients. While legal principles alone may not resolve all of the
issues raised in this article, they do represent one way in which
wronged individuals can seek redress and thus provide a necessary
first step for the assertion of rights.

